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On 15 August 1947, what had been the British Raj for nearly a century became the newly 
sovereign states of India and Pakistan. Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs celebrated their 
independence from the British and the fact that they were now sovereign peoples of two different 
states. Just three months prior, no one knew where the boundaries would fall, let alone 
anticipated the principle of partition. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that commissions formed, 
meetings were held, and boundaries were implemented, all in that short period of time. While 
August 15 brought freedom from the British, it also brought some of the worst terrors and 
violence that the region would see. Despite the violence, however, the Radcliffe Boundary—the 
border that divides present-day India and Pakistan—persisted ever since it was drawn. 
On 14 May 1948, the British withdrew from the Palestine mandate, and David Ben-
Gurion, who would become first prime minister of Israel, declared the independence of the new 
Jewish state. The Zionist dreams of a Jewish homeland were now proving to be a reality; Jews all 
around the world rejoiced that they could then call Israel their Jewish home. The Arabs, 
however, were outraged; they vehemently opposed the creation of the new state of Israel. After 
all, their requests for the creation of a single Arab state had been ignored, and they feared that the 
presence of a Jewish state would displace their populations. Not surprisingly, the day after Israel 
was declared an independent state, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 or the War of Independence 
erupted. Arab nations attacked Israel, causing violence that would persist until the present day. 
Not only did the boundaries keep consistently changing thereafter, but they were never officially 
agreed upon despite the long phase of partition efforts.  
If both cases were partitioned only ten months apart from each other, were both under 
British rule, and both had to do with religious conflict, then why did the partition of British India 
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in 1947 and the partition of British-mandated Palestine in 1948, both areas under British rule and 
with religious populations, produce different results? Why, by 1948, had the Radcliffe Boundary 
produced two independent, cartographically viable states in British India, while the proposed 
partition of British-mandated Palestine produced only one state with consistently changing 
boundaries?  
My aim is to understand why the Radcliffe Boundary remained cartographically stable 
ever since it was drawn in 1947, as opposed to the boundaries of mandatory Palestine drawn in 
1948. By taking a comparative approach, I was able to identify and analyze seven different 
factors that had key, influential roles in producing the different results. Those factors include the 
following: the presence (or lack) of an initial mutual agreement; the speed and secrecy of the 
processes; the size of the territories; the significance (cultural and religious) of the territories; the 
form of British rule (mandate v. colony); the types of immigration (static v. fluctuating); and the 
prioritization of different interests (domestic v. foreign) involved. Some of these factors played a 
larger role than others, but they all had an impact on the fates of both cases. The presence of 
these factors—or lack thereof—help explain why the partition of British India succeeded in 
creating two cartographically viable states and the partition of mandatory Palestine failed in 
doing likewise.  
It is important to note that when I use the word “stability,” I am only referring to the 
cartographic stability of the Radcliffe Boundary that the partition of British India produced. 
While the partition produced high levels of violence, bloodshed, and detrimental results, the fact 
remains that the border separating present-day India and Pakistan has remained identifiable and 
stable ever since it were implemented. While I define the cartographic stability of this boundary 
as “successful,” I am not undermining or invalidating the violence that ensued on the ground. 
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Likewise, when I use the word “failed” I am not denying Israel’s existence as a failure, but rather 
referring to the fact that its boundaries were not as cartographically stable and have kept 
consistently changing. Furthermore, the Palestine case did not produce two viable states—as was 
the case in India—but only one state that has been the subject of considerable debate and 
controversy.  
The focus of this project is on the Radcliffe Boundary and on the boundaries proposed to 
partition the state of Israel between 1937 and 1948. Due to the different nature of and the 
differing types of research materials available for each case, this project was unable to draw 
exact parallels between both cases. For example, my research at the British Library in London, 
England allowed me to find documents with the conversations between different leaders, 
outlining the desires of each side, the different terms and negotiations necessary to reach final 
agreements, and the conditions upon which the boundaries would be drawn. Furthermore, I was 
able to access the British Viceroy’s personal papers describing his challenges, frustrations, and 
intentions, in addition to correspondences between political leaders across India trying to come 
to terms with the need for partition. Access to the Viceroy’s personal papers revealed true British 
intentions—intentions that are not evident in public discourses between different parties. Having 
access to this broad range of papers, therefore, allowed me to examine a broad spectrum of 
political opinions, personal thoughts, and some levels of manipulation. However, the archival 
documents at the British Library did not reveal detailed accounts of particular physical locations 
or as to why particular geographic points were awarded to specific parties. I was unable to find a 
detailed account of the commission and Radcliffe’s decision-making process in drawing the 
boundary.   
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In contrast, the National Archives at Kew, England revealed detailed descriptions as to 
why particular sites needed to be awarded to specific parties in the Palestine case. The Colonial 
and Foreign Record Offices consisted of correspondences between the British and mainly Zionist 
leaders, outlining the Zionist or Jewish argument for Palestine in addition their specific desires 
within the land. The National Archives also provided me with memorandums and heavily 
detailed correspondences of the multiple partition efforts. However, I was unable to find 
materials that paralleled those of the British Library, describing the components of the 
boundaries. Moreover, the documents at the National Archives were more unevenly balanced; 
while I was able to examine a documents pertaining to British and Zionist leaders, I was unable 
to find a leading voice for the Palestinian Arabs, most likely due to their refusal to negotiate with 
the British throughout the partition processes. Nevertheless, I am certain that there are 
documents corresponding to Arab leaders that never made it to the Colonial and Foreign Office 
records in England.  
These differences between archival documents are reflective of the differences between 
both geopolitical cases. The Palestine case and the India case are two fundamentally distinct 
cases with different processes, leaders, desires, and disagreements. As a result, it is only natural 
that the type of sources available is likely to differ. While these differences caused me to face 
obstacles in drawing crisp parallels between both cases, they also allowed me to identify the 
factors that make each case unique. Ultimately, juxtaposing both cases allowed me to better 
comprehend and highlight these differences in trajectories and outcomes of each case, and to 
have a better understanding of partition.  
The high level of tension that the conflicts have created has produced ardent debates 
between scholars.  The tensions and ardor in regard to the current situations has produced myriad 
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of works with countless opinions and perspectives that detract from the successes of partition—
for example, the fact that two states survived in South Asia for the past sixty-seven years. While 
historians have examined the geopolitical situations in South Asia and the Middle East, most 
have done so in isolation and have not examined both regions comparatively, as my research 
aims to do. An exception, however, is Lucy Chester, a historian of South Asia who has 
juxtaposed the partitions of British India and mandatory Palestine in order to show how their 
boundary commissions were used for the purpose of contributing a “British façade of power.”1 
My research, however, aims to identify the factors that made the partition of British India prone 
to creating a cartographically stable boundary. Juxtaposing both cases will allow me to see 
connections and bigger parallels between the geographic conflict in the partition of mandatory 
Palestine and the partition of British India, allowing me to identify and isolate those variables.  
Due to time constraints in examining the vast and highly complex histories of how the 
Radcliffe Boundary and the Israel/Palestine boundaries came to be, I was limited as to what I 
could focus on regarding each partition. While it is important to acknowledge that the partition of 
British India was not just limited to the creation of India and West Pakistan, this project does not 
focus on the Bengal commission or on the creation of East Pakistan because of the different 
trajectory that the East Pakistani state would take. In 1971, East Pakistan became the state of 
Bangladesh due to different factors including but not limited to differences in language, culture, 
traditions, treatment of Muslims living in the East, and to the fact that West and East Pakistan 
were separated by a vast amount of Indian territory. Unlike the partition of the Punjab—which 
preserved the Indian and Pakistani states—the partition of Bengal took its own path under its 
own unique circumstances and does not contribute to the understanding of why the Radcliffe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chester, Lucy. “Boundary Commissions as Tools to Safeguard British Interests at the End of Empire.” Journal of 
Historical Geography, Feature: Politics and scale in boundary-making, 34, no. 3 (July 2008): 494–515.  
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Boundary remained cartographically stable. Furthermore, this project does not delve into specific 
cartographic and geographic details of the boundaries; instead, it examines the regions’ histories 
and paths to partition, and focuses on the bigger themes, arguments, factors that affected the 
boundary-making processes. 
The project explores the political thought processes and contextual background leading to 
the partitions of British India and British-mandated Palestine through the use of primary source 
documents from the British Library and the National Archives in England that portray personal 
accounts of the partition process, including private papers, memoirs, partition council minutes, 
proposals, correspondences between leaders, and conference papers, in addition to secondary 
sources from numerous specialists to support some of the arguments. The first chapter 
contextualizes the partition of British India while the second chapter contextualizes the partition 
of mandatory Palestine. Both chapters discuss the context leading to partition, the talks and 
agreements preceding partition, the structure of the boundary commissions, the drawing of the 
boundaries, and the aftermath of each case. The third chapter contains the comparative element 
of the project, outlining the variables that allowed for the India case to maintain its boundaries. 
Each variable contains a comparative component with mandatory Palestine, using the Palestine 
case to highlight India’s successes in the partition processes. By doing this comparative study, I 
hope to gain a better understanding of partition and the circumstances under which it produces 





Historians have researched and analyzed the causes of the partition of British India, 
focusing on the technicalities and the roles of politics and international factors behind the 
drawing of boundaries. Others have analyzed geopolitical influences and international 
implications, as well as the political decisions, implementations, and thought-processes that took 
place between different individuals and between political parties prior to the creation of the 
Radcliffe line—the boundary that split India and West Pakistan.2 For the Palestine case, authors 
have analyzed the main political figures’ perspectives, disagreements, and the politics behind 
partition of mandatory Palestine: who supported it and who opposed it, who talked publicly and 
who worked behind the scenes. 3  In addition, scholars have focused on analyzing the 
consequences and violence following the partitions—countless wars, bloodshed, deaths, and the 
displacement of refugees.4  
INDIA/PAKISTAN 
The partition of British India remains a topic of controversy and heated debate. Wanting 
to understand its complex nature, authors have tried to identify and analyze the multiple factors, 
events, circumstances, and long-term reasons that led and contributed to the partition of British 
India. Among those who have identified and examined these factors are C.M Phillips, Mary 
Doreen Wainright, and Kaushik Roy and H.V Hodson. Furthermore, Narendra Singh Sarila has 
focused on international factors, including “…the geo-political implications of partition and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Chester, Lucy P. Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of 
Punjab. New York: Manchester University Press, 2009; Lucy Chester. ‘Factors impeding the effectiveness of 
partition in South Asia and the Palestine mandate.’ In Order, Conflict, and Violence, eds. Stathus N. Kalyvas, Ian 
Shapiro and Tarek Masoud, pp. 77-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Narendra Singh Sarila. The 
Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006; Ian Talbot and 
Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
3 Itzhak Galnoor. The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1995; Yehoyada Haim. “Zionist Attitudes toward Partition, 1937-1938.” Jewish 
Social Studies 40, no. ¾ (July 1, 1978): 303-20; Yossi Katz. Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency’s Partition 
Plan in the Mandate Era. Portland, OR: Routledge, 1998. 
4 Joya Chatterji. “The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52.” 
Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 185–242. 
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fate of Kashmir, on Britain’s primary concern for its future defense needs and American 
involvement…”5  
A key area of discussion has been on the different roles of the British, the Indian National 
Congress, and the Muslim League. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh bring a deeper analysis of the 
role of domestic politics in regard to partition and explain the role of the League, the Congress, 
and the British in the process, focusing on the challenges, successes, and relationships between 
them. They state that the “…the division of the subcontinent was contingent on a range of 
political choices made by both the British and India’s political elites within the context of the 
impact of the Second World War on the subcontinent.”6 These two authors emphasize the 
importance of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, and argue that the role of 
the British was not as central as often thought to be. The two authors see Britain as a facilitator 
for a smooth transfer of power as opposed to an omnipotent decision-maker. 7 Partition was not 
“…a ‘parting gift’ of outgoing imperial masters: it was self-consciously willed by the All-India 
National Congress and Muslim League leaders and, above all, reflected their fears and mistrusts, 
as well as hopes, that ‘a right-sized’ state would deliver to them the power to construct a new 
political, economic and social order in a free subcontinent.”8  These desires, however, were not 
as easily established as the Congress and the League had hoped. Yasmin Khan also focuses on 
the politics between the Congress and the League, blaming the political elite and their selfish 
interests for the chaos that resulted.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Sarila, Narendra Singh. The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition. 1st Carroll & Graf 
ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006. 
6 Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. 1 edition. Cambridge  ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, 58. 
7 Chakravarty, Pallavi. “Review of The Partition of India by Ian Talbot; Gurharpal Singh.” Social Scientist 39, no. 
9/10 (September 1, 2011): 90–93. 
8 Talbot and Singh. The Partition of India: 41. 
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The Radcliffe line has been prone to high levels of criticism; indeed, a majority of 
authors have focused on the violence of partition, and has thus deemed the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent a failure. Joya Chatterji provides an anthropological and relativist perspective. She 
states that the violence involved in this process has been contained within an “acceptable, 
comprehensible, and even meaningful surgical metaphor,” arguing that “…partition was a 
necessary part of a process of healing: that it was a surgical solution to the communal disease.”9 
Her focus, however, is more closely centered on the Bengal border. In addition, Gyanendra 
Pandey, Sumit Sarkar, and Penderel Moon have also focused their work on the violent aftermath 
of partition. Pandey focuses on the moment of rupture and genocidal violence that marked the 
termination of one regime and the inauguration of two new ones and argues that a strong sense of 
nationalism was the key factor that influenced the drawing of the boundaries. 10 Similarly, 
Penderel Moon provides a vivid sense of the slaughter and massacres that took place as the cause 
of result of partition, in addition to focusing on the decade preceding the partition and on the 
Punjab’s complex politics. Similarly, Sumit Sarkar also focuses on the violence of partition and 
blames haste, selfish interests, and preservation of social order for the massacres that emerged.  
Evidently, different authors have explained the violence that followed partition in very 
different ways. Perhaps the most relatable to this project is the work of Lucy Chester, which 
provides a holistic analysis of the cartographic processes of the partition of the Punjab. She 
explains the “…complexity of nationalist dealings with colonial power structures and of colonial 
strategies of control,” but further adds that “haste, a veneer of order, a concern for international 
reputation and a conscious presentation of the process as one for which South Asians bore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chatterji, Joya. “The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s Border Landscape, 1947-52.” 
Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 185–242.  
10 Pandey, Gyanendra. Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism, and History in India.. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
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primary responsibility”11 were the four variables that influenced the partition of British India. 
Moreover, she explains how the boundary came to be drawn in only six weeks and analyses the 
complex power relationships at work in negotiations over the end of empire in South Asia,12 
especially the continuity of British colonial methods of control. As opposed to Talbot and Singh, 
Chester plays up the importance of British influence in cartographic decision-making. 
Furthermore, Chester argues that the flawed process of partition, rather than the location of the 
Radcliffe boundary, caused the terrible violence of 1947.13  
Rather than focusing on the violence, as Khan, Chester, and these authors do, I focus on 
how the cartographic decision-making led to two states that have been functional since the 
partition despite their ongoing problems. While violence was and still is a legitimate concern, I 
concentrate my research on understanding why the boundaries remained intact and ultimately 
produced two viable states. While the cartographic evolution of India and Pakistan was by no 
means perfect, I argue that the cartographic decisions made between 1937 and 1947 were such 
that produced the base for the survival of two independent and functioning states despite ongoing 
flaws.  
ISRAEL/PALESTINE 
Scholars have identified the events and factors that led to and ultimately caused the 
partition of British-mandated Palestine. While ongoing violence and development of politics is a 
reality to consider, historians have not devoted their time to closely examining the decade of 
cartographic evolution prior to the partition of 1948. With the aid of other historians’ analyses of 
events from 1937-1948, this project identifies factors and common themes that prevented the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Chester, Lucy P. Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of 
Punjab. 2009: 3. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Ibid., 1. 
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successful creation of two independent states. Rather than focusing on how the conflict has 
evolved since 1948, I aspire to understand what determining factors kept Israel and Palestine 
from reaching feasible solutions and from moving forward up until the UN Resolution in 1947.  
The political developments of 1937-1938 set the basis of what would come in the 
following years. Itzhak Galnoor, Yossi Katz, and T.G Fraser concentrate their research on those 
years, specifically on the significance of the Peel Commission Report. Galnoor examines the 
views of Zionist leaders and ideologues, and focuses on the Zionist movement’s struggle over 
the question of how to respond to the Peel Commission’s recommendation to partition Palestine 
into an Arab and a Jewish state.14 Katz provides chapters on geographical amendments to the 
Peel recommendations sought by the Jewish Agency, the Agency’s plan for partitioning 
Jerusalem, Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) discussions about transferring all or some of the 
Arab inhabitants of Palestine from the areas earmarked for Jewish sovereignty, future Jewish 
policy toward the state’s Arab minority, and other aspects of the prospective state. Katz 
concludes that the 1937-8 JAE’s partition plan acted as a predecessor for the 1947 partition plan 
and as a guideline and basis for the arrangement of 1948.15 Furthermore, T.G Fraser “…examines 
the ways in which the Peel Commission’s proposals tested…powers of leadership and the reality 
of his long-standing belief that the aims of Zionism could be achieved through British 
patronage”16 and sheds light on Weizmann’s complicated stance in making certain political 
decisions. I aim to use these historians’ analyzes on the Peel Commission in order to understand 
the cartographic starting point of the evolution toward a two-state solution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Galnoor, Itzhak. The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY Series in Israeli 
Studies. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995. 
15 Katz, Yossi. Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency’s Partition Plan in the Mandate Era. 1 edition. London  ; 
Portland, Or: Routledge, 1998. 
16 Fraser, T. G. “A Crisis of Leadership: Weizmann and the Zionist Reactions to the Peel Commission’s Proposals, 
1937-8.” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 4 (October 1, 1988): 657. 
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Politics played a key role in the decision-making process of partition not only between 
political parties but also within political parties themselves. Haim Yehoyada discusses the 
politics behind partition—who supported it and who opposed it, who talked publicly and who 
worked behind the scenes. Yehoyada gives large emphasis to the British and explains how 
“Zionists simultaneously tried to negotiate with the British to ensure the most favorable partition 
plan,” while “…the Arabs would not cope with what the Zionists saw as reality.”17 Yehoyada 
argues that British interests in Palestine were strategic, and that they were not connected to 
national aspirations unlike those of Jews and Arabs. He argues that “[t]he acceptance of reality 
was one of the causes for the partition proposal in the same way that it was one of the reasons for 
its abandonment.”18 Colin Shindler also focuses on political parties; he explores the evolution of 
the perception of partition of different political figures. He argues that the ravages of the 
Holocaust changed the perception of 1937, which had once included an equal split of supporters 
and non-supporters of partition. The perception had been that the Land of Israel was a single 
unit, historically and geographically; given the proposed dimensions of the state, it was argued 
that the state would not be economically viable, water sources would be lost, it would effectively 
ghettoize the Jews, and a large army would be required to defined its borders.19 However, he 
argues that the Holocaust proved that partition was inevitable. As Yehoyada and Shindler 
concur, the main problem was the lack of agreement between political figures.  
The path to partition was far from simple; there were myriad actors involved, many 
proposals in question, secret negotiations, and changing ideas over time. Gideon Biger attempts 
to explain and understand the process of the delimitation of Palestine by presenting an historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Haim, Yehoyada. “Zionist Attitudes toward Partition, 1937-1938.” Jewish Social Studies 40, no. 3/4 (July 1, 
1978): 315. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Shindler, Colin. “Opposing Partition: The Zionist Predicaments after the Shoah.” Israel Studies 14, no. 2 (July 1, 
2009): 90. 
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review and an analytical view concerning the actors involved in the process and an overview 
dealing with the three eras of boundary making of Israel.20 David Newman focuses on the 
variables and factors that influenced partition and highlights “the tangible dimensions of 
boundary demarcation and strategic sites, the symbolic aspects of territory, the way in which 
such territories are part of the process through which national identities are constructed and 
maintained.”21 However, he discusses the process of territorial change within the Israel/Palestine 
arena, focusing on the long-term rather than any specific event because he argues that the politics 
of identity are key in an era of globalization and boundary permeability. He also touches upon 
many of the deep-rooted symbolic dimensions of the conflict, rather than just the tangible 
dimensions of how and where a boundary is to be demarcated.22 Keeping those variables in 
mind, Howard M. Sachar provides a highly detailed historical account of the path to Israel’s 
creation.23 
The British played a key role in the process of partition—their unkept promises, greed, 
and imperial motives influenced the overall partition process. Aaron S. Kleiman explains 
Britain’s “divide and rule,” focusing on the motives of the imperial power as a means by which 
to advance partition. He explains the significance of different political documents and policies, 
like 1939 White Paper, and the agonies of divide and rule and their divisive effects.24 Most 
importantly, he argues that “ what began as a real attempt at a complete and final solution of the 
Palestine problem became overshadowed by the need to produce first a bureaucratic 
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consensus.”25 Michael Cohen also analyzes the White Paper, British policy during the critical 
phase, Zionist leadership, and Palestine and Arab federation. His project is to trace out “‘the 
story… of the attempt made by each of the various parties now involved with the Palestine 
problem—Britain, the United States, the Jews, and the Arabs—to impose its own solution to the 
problem’ of how Palestine should be governed when the British mandate came to an end, with an 
eye to determining the extent to which each party was responsible for creating the fundamentally 
untenable situation that emerged from the 1948 war.”26 The sources he provides and his analyzes 
are helpful for understanding the relationships and interactions between different political 
parties. 
Penny Sinonoglou provides British plans for the partition of Palestine and highlights the 
importance of “tracing the roots of the 1937 Peel Commission plan back to conversations taking 
place in the Colonial Office and government of Palestine as early as 1929.” 27  A close analysis 
of dialogues over territorial division and of preliminary partition plans leads to the conclusion 
that Britain’s focus on the ideal of representative government played a primary role in the 
development of partition proposals. This article argues that inter-ethnic violence played was not 
as significant, and that partition was proposed as a solution to the political implications of non-
representative government in Palestine, a topic constantly in the spotlight thanks to the League of 
Nations. 28 
Personal narratives also help obtain a richer understanding of the difficult and complex 
path to partition. Ismar J. Peritz, and Carl E. Purinton’s The Boundaries and the Disposition of 
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the Holy Land and Emile Ghory’s An Arab View of the Situation in Palestine provide biblical, 
religious, political, and personal views of the land. These perspectives, in turn, help to explain 
some of the reasoning behind certain decisions. As Peritz and Purinton’s state, “The whole 
question hinges on whether ‘national’ is to be taken in a political or cultural sense.”29 For 
example, Emile Ghory provides an Arab perspective from when the boundaries were being 
decided, providing a first-hand account of the workings of the land. While these authors do not 
explore political or cartographic decisions, they provide strong perspectives that provide cultural 
context as to why political leaders made particular decisions in regard to partition.
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CHAPTER 1: BRITISH INDIA 
After almost seven decades since its implementation, the Radcliffe Boundary, which 
divides present-day India and Pakistan, has remained in place. While the region has been prone 
to regular border violence and its share of political instability, the fact remains that both India 
and Pakistan remained two sovereign states with their own governments, militaries, economies, 
and international recognition. Even with the ongoing tensions and hatred between both states, the 
Radcliffe Boundary has remained cartographically identifiable and has not undergone significant 
changes since 1947. Thus, I seek to understand what makes the partition of British India—in 
particular, the partition of the Punjab—so remarkably distinct from other world regions that the 
British attempted to partition. I also seek to determine why the Radcliffe Boundary was 
cartographically sustainable despite being planned and implemented in a hasty three-month 
period and the high levels of violence that it ensued.  
As an attempt to have a better understanding of the factors that allowed for the partition 
of British India to produce two cartographically viable states, this chapter examines the events, 
processes, and commissions that led to the creation and implementation of the Radcliffe 
Boundary in the Punjab on 15 August 1947. The chapter does not go into cartographic detail of 
the boundary, nor does it focus on the boundary-making policies and processes that took place in 
the partition of Bengal. Instead, the chapter focuses on the historical events, talks and agreements 
that resulted in the partition of the Punjab, followed by an effort to understand the overarching 




PATH TO PARTITION 
The path to partition evolved as a result of tensions and hostilities between Muslims and 
Hindus throughout the duration of British rule. The inability to reconcile these religious 
differences led to geopolitical tensions and high levels of violence in the 1930s and 1940s. As 
Yasmin Khan states, “[i]n the three decades preceding Partition a self-conscious awareness of 
religious ethnicity—and conflict based on this—had undoubtedly escalated in intensity and was 
becoming more flagrant.”1 Riots broke out on religious festivals, and reformist groups became 
richer, stronger, more dogmatic and persuasive; religion was becoming a “politicized 
manifestation of identity.”2 
 Part of the reason for these differences and politicization came about as a result of 
British rule and the growing sense of nationalism within India. The British stratified the different 
religions of India through the use of the census, highlighting the differences between them rather 
than preserving their sense of community and brotherhood. As Khan explains, “Reminders of 
religious difference were built into the brickwork of the colonial state,” such as labeling drinking 
taps on railway platforms as Hindu water or Muslim water, even though such strict separations 
had never existed.3 The British strongly perceived Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs as fundamentally 
separate groups, and thus, in 1909, gave separate electorates to the different religious 
communities represented by their own politicians.4 The presence of separate electorates, in 
addition to the measures that the British took to classify and distinguish between religious 
communities further stratified and accentuated the differences between India’s inhabitants rather 
than preserving the coexistence that had once existed.  	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As differences deepened and violence grew, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the central leader of 
the Muslim League, proposed a grouping of provinces in united India in which Muslims could 
have their own form of governance in order to diminish social injustices and ensure equal rights 
and just treatment next to their non-Muslim counterparts.5 Initially, Jinnah did not want a new 
state that would separate Muslims from India; instead, he sought Pakistan as a separate space and 
better position for Muslims within India, with separate electorates, reservation of seats, and 
Muslim majority provinces, all of which would secure parity with non-Muslims in India. 6 Jinnah 
already considered the Musulmans a nation by definition due to their religious and cultural 
bonds,7 which is why he initially thought that the creation of a Muslim state was unnecessary. As 
a community, Muslims did not need to live outside what had been their home for many years, 
Mother India. Opposing partition, Jinnah simply hoped for “…the freedom of all India, and not 
the freedom of one section or, worse still, of the Congress caucus, and slavery for Musalmans 
and other minorities.”8 Ultimately, Jinnah and the Muslim League “adopted Pakistan as its goal 
for the political evolution for the community…” believing that India’s Muslims “deserved some 
kind of autonomous political entity.”9  
Like Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru, the central leader for the Indian National Congress, did 
not initially support the idea of partition. As Nehru explained in a speech in 1937: “In India… no 
one, whatever his political views or religious persuasions, thinks in terms other than those of 
national unity.”10 Nehru argued that India had been home to a diverse range of peoples for 
hundreds of years—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and other faiths—that could not imagine living 	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separately, or in something other than a united India. As a result, Nehru’s priority was the 
equality and unity of all of India’s inhabitants, rather than the separation and isolation of specific 
groups of people. Nehru hoped for independence from the British, and he maintained that the 
new state of India would be a secular state in which everyone stood on equal footing.11 In 
disagreement with Jinnah, Nehru “…repudiated the notion of compulsory grouping of provinces, 
the key to Jinnah’s Pakistan,”12 as that would further isolate the different religious groups and 
make it more difficult to rule all of India. The Congress wanted “…a central government that 
could direct and plan for an India, free of colonialism, that might eradicate its people’s poverty 
and grow into an industrial power.”13 However, the desire of the Congress to have a powerful 
interventionist state made Jinnah nervous; he wanted to avoid being the subordinate group within 
India.     
The British started to lose their grip over India during to the Second World War with 
growing disruptions in the colonies of their empire. Though victorious in the war, Britain 
suffered immensely during the conflict and did not possess the manpower or economic resources 
to coerce a restive India.14 Rebuilding back at home and creating new jobs and housing promised 
by the new socialist government were prioritized over a costly reassertion of the Raj. As a result 
of this economic struggle, there was a decrease in British power, which caused Indian society to 
undergo readjustment and demobilization. To the British, India had become a political, symbolic, 
and economic liability, which is why “ridding itself of its Indian encumbrances became a 
priority.”15 This disintegration of British power led to heavy international pressure to decolonize.  
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As a result, Britain began to plan for a transfer of power in 1946. How they would 
transfer power, however, remained significantly ambiguous. As Khan states, “Partition was 
closely entwined with this slow, protracted passage of decolonization, which has been masked by 
the pedantic language of the transfer of power.”16 The general elections in 1945-1946, which 
elected members of the Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State, “…reduced the 
political scene to the Congress and the Muslim League, now as never before pitted directly 
against each other.”17 The Congress won the most number of seats because it was the largest 
party, but the League won all the Muslim votes, which meant that League had won the power to 
seek a separate Muslim homeland. 
The League and the Congress began to further stratify each religious group, thus 
increasing the tensions between them. For example, Muslim League activists grew more 
extreme, fusing Islam with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity.18 As a result, India was 
“rocked by rebellions and revolts on an unprecedented scale,”19 including strikes, industrial 
disputes, serious police mutinies, and anti-British protest movements, such as the Great Calcutta 
Killing in 1946 during which over 4,000 Hindus and Muslims slaughtered each other in Calcutta. 
These violent outbursts and the desire for sovereignty led people from both parties—the League 
and the Congress—to propose different plans for compromise. Partition, however, was never 
truly an apparent, desired, or viable option until the summer of the partition itself. As Khan 
explains, “Nehru himself started to imagine Partition as a possible way out. As Jinnah 
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continually vetoed the vision of one strong united India, it emerged that the price of a strong 
central government was the division of the country.”20  
In order to avoid more deaths, the British determined that partition was a realistic 
solution. With the violence and chaos growing, Britain finally made the executive decision, 
through the 3rd June Plan, to transfer power on 15 August 1947. As Yasmin Khan explains, 
“Fervent public displays of anti-colonial sentiment in post-war India help to explain the frenzied 
British scramble to depart from the Indian subcontinent.”21 Partition was shaped by decades of 
Indian nationalist pressure on the British Government and by the rise of civil unrest in the 
subcontinent.22 Violence, tensions, and a need for a centralized government increased. As Talbot 
and Singh state, “The British transfer of power to the two dominions of India and Pakistan… was 
a response to imperial statecraft to intractable religious conflict.” 23  This “self-conscious 
awareness” was a result of British rule. As Britain loosened its grip on India, and Muslims and 
non-Muslims advocated for their sovereignty, the representatives of the Muslim League and 
Indian Congress, respectively, came to different ideas and perceptions as to what a united India 
would look like after the British Raj. As a result, “Mountbatten and his staff had to make a host 
of momentous decisions—above all, whether power was to be handed over to two, three, or more 
successor states; and where the boundary line between then was to be drawn.”24 Three months 
before the actual partition of British India, it was evident that partition would occur. What no one 
knew, however, was how or where those boundaries would fall.  
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TALKS & AGREEMENTS  
On a June 3rd meeting, political leaders formulated the 3 June Plan, which would serve as 
the basis of agreement between the Muslim League, the Indian Congress, and the Sikh 
community to partition British India into two independent states. According to the plan, the 
British government would accept the principle of partition of India, that successor governments 
would be given dominion status, and India had the implicit right to secede from the British 
Commonwealth. This meeting took place a month prior to the official agreement, which acted as 
a formal predecessor to the boundary drawings. The open dialogue and communication that took 
place between the parties allowed for a high level of negotiations and agreements that would 
prove crucial to the cartographic sustainability of the Radcliffe Boundary. As the British 
Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten argued in regard to the June 3 Plan:  “The plan was evolved at every 
stage by a process of open diplomacy with the leaders. Its success is chiefly attributable to them. 
I believe that this system of open diplomacy was the only one suited to the situation in which the 
problems were so complex and the tension so high.”25  Despite the level of confrontation, 
however, the partition process was, as Lucy Chester puts it, “changing almost daily.”26 
In early July, all parties agreed to accept the states that would be formed in August 1947 
regardless of their boundaries. As Mountbatten noted, “At a Meeting on 2nd July, the Partition 
Council issued a statement in which they pledged themselves to accept the awards of the 
Boundary Commissions whatever these might be; and, as soon as the awards were announced, to 
enforce them impartially.”27 By agreeing to those conditions, it was evident that the Congress 
and the League had a strong desire to have their own national space. That desire to be sovereign 	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made people work with what they had even if the outcome was not ideal. As was mentioned in 
the Partition Council Minutes, “Mr. Jinnah pointed out that although he was doing everything in 
his power to retain a hold over the Muslim sections of the population concerned to honour the 
undertaking given that the findings of the Boundary Commissions, whatever they were, would be 
accepted…”28  
Although it was likely that all parties would not be fully pleased with the final 
boundaries, the strong desire to have independent states outweighed the possibility of backlash 
and disagreement prior to the awards. All parties would win and lose certain aspects of the 
territory, which was only natural in the negotiations. As Mountbatten described in one of his 
personal reports from August 1947: 
Neither the Congress, the League, nor the Sikhs were in any way satisfied or grateful for 
any advantages they may have got out of the awards; they could only think of the 
disadvantages and complain bitterly. It was only after they had been complaining loudly 
for some time that they appeared to realize that there must be some advantages to them if 
the other parties were equally dissatisfied; and so after some two hours very delicate 
handling, we arrived at the conclusion that the awards must be announced and 
implemented loyally forthwith.29  
 
It is important to note that the Sikh community was one of the most highly affected throughout 
the partition process due to the fact that their people were densely concentrated in the Punjab 
region and that their requests went unattended. Their religious and cultural attachment to the land 
vanished as politics and violence as the tearing of their land took over. Nevertheless, the Sikhs 
tried to resist; as was mentioned in the July 11-12 Partition Council minutes: “…the Sikh leaders 
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were still reported to be inciting their followers to offer active resistance to decisions which they 
might regard as unfavourable.”30 As Mountbatten explained,  
The Sikhs in their endeavours to obtain a real ‘Sikhistan’ are most anxious to take in a 
large part of the area where the Muslim population predominates. To this I am absolutely 
opposed. The Sikhs also want their holy places preserved for them, including Lahore 
itself, the capital-designate of Pakistan. It is significant, however, that when the Sikh 
delegation saw me they particularly asked that I should not decide whether the Sikhs 
would join Pakistan or Hindustan, since they had not made up their minds to which side 
they wanted to go.31  
 
The Sikhs were deprived of their own state and independence and were forced to choose between 
one of the two dominions. The idea of attaining a Sikhistan was ignored due to the fact that the 
Congress and League were the central players in the partition processes. This uneven distribution 
of power is also evident in the way the commissions were divided—there were two judges both 
from the Congress and the League and only one Sikh representative, Sardar Swaran Singh, who 
was part of the Congress as well. Clearly, the Sikhs did not have a strong voice in this process; 
however, it was not until a long period of resistance that they ultimately agreed to the boundary 
commission’s plans.  
Toward the end of July, the agreement to create these two states was solidified. As a 
prominent Sikh representative argued, “It is understood that in a statement issued on 24th July the 
members of the Partition Council at New Delhi, including Sardar Baldev Singh on behalf of the 
Sikh community, pledges the Governments of the two future Dominions of India and Pakistan to 
accept the awards...”32 Rather than working backward—proposing a plan and then agreeing to 
it—all parties agreed in advance to whatever the plan would be. This form of agreement is key to 
the plan’s implementation because it is precisely what allowed for the partition to be reinforced 	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as opposed to having ongoing debates. As the Viceroy declared on 25 July, 29 1947: “I am glad 
to be able to report that all the members of the Punjab Partition Committee […] declared that 
their parties would accept and abide by the decision of the Boundary Commission, in spite of 
threats in the press by both Muslims and Sikhs that they would fight rather than accept an 
‘unfair’ award.”33 After all, in Amritsar and Lahore there had already been a campaign of 
assassination and arson by individuals.34 However, the two parties were committed to having two 
states by this point—they were only awaiting the boundary awards.  
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 
Once the British, the Indian National Congress, and the Muslim League agreed to the 
creation of two sovereign states, the conversations between them became more detailed and 
holistic. Two boundary commissions—one for the Punjab and one for Bengal—began to form. 
As was mentioned in an interview in 1947 between Mountbatten and other political leaders:  
It was suggested that the number of assessors should be five in the Punjab Boundary 
Commission and four in the Bengal Boundary Commission. In details these would be—in 
Punjab, one Muslim representative from Western Punjab; one Hindu representative from 
Eastern Punjab; one Sikh representative; one representative from Pakistan as a whole and 
one representative from Hindustan as a whole. In Bengal the composition would be the 
same mutatis mutandis and without of course the Sikh representative.35  
 
On 13 June, Nehru, Jinnah, and Mountbatten agreed that “…each commission would consist of 
two Congress nominees and two League nominees, with an independent chairman, that all of 
these men would be of ‘high judicial standing’ and that Congress would include a Sikh among its 
nominees for the Punjab commission.” 36  Of the four judges on the Punjab Boundary 
commission, the following were included: Muhammad Munir, Din Muhammad, Mehr Chand 	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Mahajan, Teja Singh,37 and Sardar Swaran Singh. Interestingly, “All of the judges came from 
backgrounds in criminal law and lacked any expertise in boundary-making.”38 Ironically, the 
only professional geographer known to have participated in the process was Okar Spate, a 
respected Australian geographer who “felt the risks inherent in [the] northern Punjabi 
location.”39 
By including a representative of each religious group involved in the geopolitical 
conflict, the commissions ensured a balance from all sides. Due to predictable disagreement and 
tensions between the different political representatives, it was necessary to appoint a common 
link to both commissions in order to mediate and establish a greater sense of order and control. 
Jinnah proposed someone British as chairman or link of the boundary commissions. In a June 
1947 telegram to the governors of the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam, Mountbatten stated that 
“Jinnah has cast doubt on probability of Chairmen being agreed either between nominated 
members of Commissions or party leaders. He had suggested instead a British judge for 
chairman.”40 It was not until the 27 of June that Radcliffe was put forward as candidate for the 
Arbitral Tribunal, a panel of adjudicators that made decisions to which the parties in dispute had 
to agree. However, this proposal of Radcliffe took place very late; on 30 June the Government of 
India announced the formation of the Punjab and Bengal boundary commissions,41 and partition 
followed about six weeks later. Ultimately, Lord Cyril Radcliffe, “…a loyal servant of the 
British Government who had previously demonstrated his dedication to the interests of the 
British state,” 42 served as the chair for both boundary commissions. Radcliffe, however, was not 	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“an independent expert with boundary-making experience,”43 and he “lacked the personal 
knowledge necessary to evaluate the conflicting claims…”44 Nevertheless, the British perceived 
him as one of the most intelligent Englishmen of the time and thus deemed him the ideal figure 
to execute difficult decisions.  
DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES 
The Commissions had representatives from all parties and were responsible for 
demarcating the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of contiguous majority 
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it was to also take into account other factors.45 
The problem, however, is that those other factors—including notional boundaries, religious 
contiguity, natural markers, and irrigation systems—were not only numerous, but also quite 
ambiguous, which resulted in disputes. This level of ambiguity kept both sides from knowing 
what the final boundaries would be until the British announced and implemented them on 15 
August 1947. As Lucy Chester explains,  
This ambiguity was intended to allow the commissioners flexibility to accommodate 
concerns that might emerge during their deliberations and to ensure that excessively 
restrictive terms did not slow down the boundary-creation process. The obvious factors 
included administrative needs, geographical features, and communication and irrigation 
infrastructure…46 
 
In addition, the high levels of secrecy played a key role—they prevented everyone outside the 
commissions from having a say, which diminished the amount of debate and outside 
interference. Overall, the partition process was a phenomenon of differing beliefs and a 
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geographical reality that, as Lucy Chester explains, “remained as murky as the political 
circumstances behind it.”47  
Because there had been no similar earlier cartographic conflicts in India, the partition 
plans were partially based on the idea of notional boundaries; that is, boundaries by which 
populations had already lived for many years (see map 1A). As a result, the notional boundary 
was a concept on which the boundary commissions could rely. As was stated in the Partition 
Council Minutes of 10-13 July: “…if the boundary has not been so determined by 15th August, 
the two new Provinces shall be established on the basis of what is commonly described at the 
‘notional’ boundary.”48 Villages were already grouped together according to their respective 
religion, and thus the concept of having a notional boundary was one of the several factors that 
contributed to the boundary-making process.  As a result, the commissions took the religiously 
contiguous Muslim and Hindu areas into serious consideration.  
The borderline was also based upon physical or natural markers and pre-existing 
administrative borders, including thanas (stations), tehils (sub-divisions), rivers, and natural 
frontiers. The purpose of this basis, as the Partition Council Minutes of 11-12 July indicate, was 
“…[to provide] defensible boundaries and markings for general administrative convenience”49 in 
order to avoid large population transfers and measures that would deeply alter people’s lives. Up 
to independence, India’s population was relatively static, which meant that people were not 
moving around in large numbers and thus remained in the same general areas. In order to avoid 
excessive change, the commissions wanted to base their boundary drawings on what was already 
present on the ground. As was discussed within the Boundary Commission:  	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Where there is no natural boundary line, a demarcation will run through numerous 
interlocked villages, zig-zag the countryside and lead to constant irritation to both 
dominions. To avoid this it is necessary to have a natural boundary line as far as possible. 
The proposition is of great importance and must be looked into with great care.50  
 
Thus, the purpose of having natural landmarks was similar to that of having a notional 
boundary—the less change, the better and easier it would be for the boundary commission and 
India’s inhabitants. The goal was to avoid creating more tensions than necessary.  
However, natural markers were sometimes more likely to cause more trouble. For 
example, Radcliffe’s description was based on rivers—as opposed to exact latitudinal and 
longitudinal points—which resulted in a lack of geographic specificity and precision. 
Sometimes, rivers overflowed or dried which would consequently blur where the boundaries 
were, making certain sections of the border invisible for part of the year and causing disastrous 
effects on border security and administration.51  
Radcliffe also focused on irrigation systems, given that the irrigation systems had been 
built to function under a single administration.52 As Radcliffe describes in his award: “The fixing 
of a boundary… was further complicated by the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life of 
the Punjab but developed only under the conception of a single administration, and of systems of 
road and rail communication, which have been planned in the same way.”53 It was necessary for 
Radcliffe to pay attention to irrigation systems and infrastructure because otherwise, the viability 
of India and Pakistan would have been threatened. As Chester notes, “Radcliffe’s line was based 
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primarily on the need to balance the division of religious majorities with the preservation of 
Punjab’s life-giving irrigation systems.”54 
The need to balance religious majorities played a key role because that principle 
influenced and set a basis as to how and why boundaries needed to be drawn. After all, if there 
had not been Muslim majorities in the North-East and North-West of India, “…neither Jinnah 
nor anyone else would have been in a position to put forward a plea for the division of the 
country.”55 However, the idea of basing the boundaries on the principle of religious identity 
alone was a dangerous one that had the potential of creating further discrepancies. As a result, 
the principle of religion and religious contiguity played a role, but it was not the only factor, as is 
explained above. As Nehru once stated,  
At present this question of a boundary is thought far too much in terms of Sikh, Hindu or 
Muslim interests. I suppose every party will produce arguments for the inclusion of a 
little bit of territory here and there. The result might well be a very curious frontier line 
with numerous curves and enclaves.56   
 
Religious communities and villages were intermixed and not always crisply divided, 
which further complicated the notion of dividing the territory on the principle of religious 
contiguity. The boundary negotiations were not simple or perfect by any means. Indeed, there 
were discrepancies because it was impossible to find ways in which to divide the clusters of 
religious populations perfectly. For example, “…three key tehsils of the Gurdaspur district had 
gone over to India despite the fact that two of them… had Muslim majorities.”57 The boundaries 
did not guarantee the complete separation of Hindus and Muslims in some districts, as was 
explained in the papers of Sir Evan Jenkins, governor of the Punjab, in 1947:  	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The Inspector General also drew attention to the fact that although the proportion of 
Muslims in the ranks of the police was between 60 and 70 per cent for the whole 
province, there were very few non-Muslims in the western districts and so the figures for 
places like Lahore and Amritsar were about 60% Muslims and 40% non-Muslims.58  
 
Although it was impossible to divide the territory entirely according to religious identity alone, 
the failure to solve these discrepancies led both sides to “…eliminate minorities which existed on 
the wrong side of the line.”59 Consequently, these elimination efforts resulted in more conflict 
and violence after partition.  
Another problem that affected the end result was that the census data for religious 
demographics was not entirely accurate. As Lucy Chester explains,  
…the data themselves were highly problematic, as the census had become increasingly 
politicized… The 1921 and 1931 censuses…had been disrupted by Gandhi’s non-
cooperation campaigns, resulting in Hindu and Sikh totals lower than they should have 
been. The 1941 census, by contrast, had been conducted at a time when more populous 
communal groups received more representation and thus more political power…60 
 
Furthermore, “[s]urvey of India maps were not the scientific, rationally constructed documents 
they seemed neither was the boundary commission the judicial, rationally constructed entity it 
appeared to be. These maps, like the large process of partition, were not adequately connected to 
the reality of what was happening on the ground.”61 This lack of accuracy in regard to religious 
contiguity was consequential; when the boundaries were implemented, there were huge 
migrations of people on both sides of the border due to their religious identity. Rather than 
preventing violence, the miscalculations created it. In addition, the short period of time allotted 
to the commissions to draw the boundaries gave them no time to explore and familiarize 
themselves with the territory. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “Papers of Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab,” 1947. IOR/R/3/1/176; Confidential; 25th June 1947; from 
Inspector General of Police, Punjab; 217/73. 
59 Brush, John E. “The Distribution of Religious Communities in India.” Annals of the Association of   
American Geographers 39, no. 2 (June 1, 1949): 96. 
60 Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia, 65. 
61 Ibid., 100. 
35 
In fact, Radcliffe only allotted a few paragraphs to describe where the boundary fell. As 
Lucy Chester explains, “Privileging textual descriptions over visual representations is… a basic 
tenet of boundary-making practice”62  that, interestingly, Radcliffe chose to take. Because 
Radcliffe based his description of the boundary on text rather than on precise visual depictions, 
he produced ambiguity that affected the ways in which the boundary was actually implemented. 
In the award, he only allots a few paragraphs to the description of the boundary. As he describes,  
The boundary between the East and West Punjab shall commence on the north at the 
point where the west branch of the Ujh River enters the Punjab Province from the State of 
Kashmir. The boundary shall follow the line of that river down the western boundary of 
the Pathankot Tahsil to the point where the Pathankot, Shakargarh and Gurdaspur tahsols 
meet. The tehsil boundary and not the actual course of the Ujh River shall constitute 
boundary between the East and West Punjab.63  
 
Boundaries fell on names of villages, rivers, and natural landmarks rather than on precise 
longitudinal and latitudinal points. Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs moved around the boundary until 
the borders solidified and became officially guarded and protected. Radcliffe was able to 
implement the boundaries in such a broad way and people were able to move around because of 
the large space available. As mentioned earlier, the high level of ambiguity was double sided; it 
created confusion, but it also allowed for some flexibility.  
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Ultimately, the Radcliffe Boundary left minorities of each group on both sides of the 
boundary, which would result in high levels of tension and violence (see map 2A). As Lucy 
Chester explains, “The Radcliffe award gave Pakistan 63,800 square miles of Punjabi territory, 
while India received 35,300 square miles. […] This left Pakistani Punjab with a minority 
population of 26.8 per cent. Indian Punjab had an even larger minority population of about 25 
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percent, but neither side would retain these minorities for long.”64 Foreseeing these demographic 
issues, both the Indian Congress and the Muslim League made arrangements to guarantee some 
form of stability before independence was granted. Both sides negotiated matters like refugee 
issues, resources, governments, and other responsibilities and had to make compromises and 
sacrifices in order to reach conclusions in regard to each state.  
The fact that this type of conversation occurred shows that both entities were serious and 
determined to be independent. After all, some state qualities include having an army, provisions, 
government, and relations with other states. For example, both states acknowledged and 
addressed refugee problems:  
…it was the duty of the Pakistan Government to take over the responsibility for the 
refugees who had no means and no homes to which to return. The India Government had 
already assumed the responsibility for refugees in its territory and had appointed a special 
officer, in accordance with the decision of the Interim Government, to see to the 
provision of food, clothing and shelter etc. for them.65  
 
The concept of refugees accentuates the idea of citizenship, which in turn accentuates the idea of 
independence. The fact that both states discussed refugee issues prior to the partition itself shows 
the commitment to divide the land, but it is also telling of the new national sentiments that had 
not previously existed. For example, acknowledging the existence of refugees showed that those 
who had once belonged to one area no longer felt welcome or accepted in the other. By labeling 
people as refugees, both states started to acknowledge each other’s existence and abided by the 
assigned boundaries despite the mounting tensions and disagreements. The boundaries 
legitimized each people’s nationality and essence, but they also pitted people against each other 
in ways that had never occurred.  
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Having an army is another definitive element of an independent state; it is what protects a 
state’s borders against invaders. The British gave the two dominions true responsibilities, such as 
creating armies of their own. In doing so, the British recognized the states’ existence and 
guaranteed their sovereignty. As was discussed in the August Partition Minutes: “...Field 
Marshall Montgomery had discussed with Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah the question of the rate 
of withdrawal of the British Army from India after the 15th of August… the withdrawal of 
British Units should commence on the 15th of August, proceed gradually, and be completed by 
the end of February, 1948, at the latest,”66 signifying that the two future states would be 
responsible for their own militaries. In addition, both states began to create their respective 
governments recognized by Belgium, Canada, China, Columbia, the UK and the USA in 
Resolution 47 of 1948 on the India-Pakistan Questions.  
This type of conversation revolving around refugee issues, governments, and state 
responsibilities prior to the declaration of the separate states shows that the commissioners were 
aware that partition would bring consequences, and thus wanted to be prepared. The fact that 
both states were able to distinguish where one state ended and where another began as well as 
acknowledge each other’s trade regulations showed their viability as two independent entities. 
Both states created a relationship with each other despite the violence and chaos. As 
Mountbatten described in one of his personal reports from August 1947:  
One further interesting point is that the respective Governments are so anxious to assume 
complete responsibility for their own areas that they are contemplating tomorrow 
working out a scheme to take over military responsibility for their own areas once the 
Boundary awards have been implemented. The two Prime Ministers have also invited 
each other to visit Lahore and Amritsar respectively together. Altogether the situation, 
bad it is, is being grappled with in a realistic manner by the new Governments.67  
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This level of recognition further legitimized the states’ existence once independence was 
declared. There was violence after the partition because people now had a true sense of what 
territory was theirs and had to leave the respective places in which they were no longer accepted. 
This possession of territory made people more and attached to their land that was now theirs, but 
it made others bitter, for many had lost what had been their homes for generations. 
Although the boundaries of India and Pakistan brought unfathomable violence, casualties, 
and conflict, the fact remains that India and Pakistan became two separate, independent entities 
that have survived up to the present day with distinguishable borders, armies, central forms of 
government, and a sense of nationalism. Both states gained international recognition right after 
they received independence, which reinforced the legitimacy of the new states, and thus allowed 





















 	  	  	  	  	  
Map 1A – Notional Boundary 

























 	  	  
Map 1B – Radcliffe Boundary 
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CHAPTER 2: MANDATORY PALESTINE 
The partition of mandatory Palestine has a long history of struggles from multiple sides 
and dimensions: the Jews, the Arabs, and the foreign powers trying to cope with their strife for 
independence, interests, and nationhood. There were myriad discussions, private negotiations, 
and broken promises—all of which created tensions that would expand and cause more conflict 
in the Middle East. Rather than creating a holistic conversation in which all parties were 
involved, boundary negotiations contained a certain level of disorganization and chaos that 
prevented each side from obtaining what it wanted. This chapter examines the circumstances, 
variables, and arguments that led to the principle of partition, followed by an analysis of the 
partition commissions and of the factors that influenced each partition proposal.  
PATH TO PARTITION 
During their control of Palestine, the British made promises to Arabs and to Jews that 
proved to be contradictory and difficult to keep. Among these contradictory promises were Arab 
sovereignty and the establishment of a Jewish national home. The British did not make these 
promises with the main purpose of satisfying the Arabs or the Jews, but rather out of their own 
self-interest. The selfishness, hypocrisy, and the inability to keep these promises created a series 
of tensions that eventually escalated into conflict. These contradictory promises and agreements 
were the result of private meetings between many political leaders and the lack of an inclusive 
conversation in which the Arabs and Jews could share their desires with all of the other great 
powers.  
The presence of the Great powers in the Middle East caused great unrest among the 
Arabs, which consequently led to their movement for sovereignty. There were a number of 
correspondences between the Arabs and the British, mainly the Hussein-McMahon 
41 
correspondence in July-October 1915, in which the British promised the Arabs in return for 
entering World War I, the British would support and negotiate for Arab independence. While the 
Arabs thought their plans were on track to become a sovereign people, the reality proved 
otherwise; the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France in 1916 defined the 
great powers’ proposed spheres of influence and direct control over the Arab Middle East and, 
once again, ignored and thus delayed Arab independence. Britain and France prioritized their 
own interests over those of the Arabs and claimed more control of the territories. The Sykes-
Picot treaty allocated what would become the Jordan River, Jordan, Southern Iraq, and a small 
area including the ports of Haifa and Acre to Britain, south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, 
and Lebanon to France, and Istanbul, the Turkish straits, and the Ottoman Armenian vilayets to 
Russia. Ultimately, the Sykes-Picot Agreement gave more power to the great powers, once again 
ignoring Arabs demands to be independent. 
As the Arabs strove for their sovereignty, the Jewish scene in Europe grew progressively 
worse. Anti-Semitism was on the rise in Europe and was proving to be detrimental. An example 
of such anti-Semitism is the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s, a case in which a Jewish French officer 
was court-martialled on a framed charge of high treason and espionage for Germany1 simply 
because of his Jewish identity. It was this type of attack that made Theodore Herzl, the founder 
of modern political Zionism, advocate for the Jewish people and the creation of their own 
homeland. He believed Jews needed to defend themselves and put a stop to the perpetual hatred. 
Thus, at the First Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basle, Theodore Herzl and other Zionist leaders 
discussed and defined the aim of Zionism: to gather the Jews and establish a home for them in 
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the land of Palestine.2 Herzl’s book, The Jewish State, described what his ideal Jewish state 
would look like. While other Zionists offered different ideas of a utopic Jewish homeland, they 
all shared a strong urge for “…the establishment of a Jewish centre as a solution to Jewish 
suffering and discrimination.”3 The search for the Jewish National home included talks and 
negotiations with the British who, after much debate in 1917, promised the establishment of a 
Jewish National Home through the Balfour Declaration. However, the notion of a Jewish 
National Home remained ambiguous; there was no reference to a state or a particular piece of 
territory and, as a result, no one knew what, exactly, a Jewish National Home meant. As a result, 
the Zionists drafted a constitution under which Palestine would be reconstituted as a Jewish 
Commonwealth, hoping this more aggressive stance would dispel some of the Balfour 
Declaration’s ambiguity.4  
At the San Remo Peace Conference in 1920, the great powers divided and distributed the 
former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, in which the British were awarded Palestine as its 
mandate. In addition, the Balfour Declaration was linked to the mandatory award, which marked 
the first time that a great power of the first rank pledged its full support to the idea of helping the 
Jews to have their national home in the land of Palestine, whose population was about 87 percent 
Arab.5 Britain’s obligation under the mandate was to provide a fair and just administration, 
honest bureaucracy, physical and economic well-being of Palestine’s inhabitants, and 
conciliation of the ethnic and religious sensibilities of both the Arab and the Jewish 
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communities; however, reconciling the Zionist goals and the national aspirations of Palestine’s 
Arab’s majority turned out to be more difficult than the British had expected.6  
Britain had numerous tasks and duties to fulfill in Palestine upon the start of the mandate. 
As Howard Sachar explains, “When Britain assumed responsibility for the Holy Land, it took 
over an economic cripple, a nation that was impoverished well beyond the ravages of the war 
itself. Under-populated, boasting little industry or trade and few known natural resources, 
Palestine was debilitated, too, by administrative chaos no less than by famine.”7 The British 
brought economic law and order, implemented a government system with British, Muslim, 
Jewish, and Christian representation, and replaced the entire Ottoman criminal and commercial 
codes with modern legislation and the English Common Law and Equity.8 The British continued 
the practice of religious autonomy, carried out educational reforms, and developed departments 
of agriculture and public health that mostly concentrated on the Arabs. While the Jews also 
benefitted from these British concessions, they provided and sustained their own social services. 
This Jewish growth and progress resulted in the development of thriving Jewish cities through 
the urban Jewish sector, and the development of the Hebrew language and of Jewish institutions, 
such as the Technion and Hebrew University.9 
These developments and the notion of finally having a Jewish National Home was 
gradually becoming a reality for the Jews. As Howard Sachar explains, “If the British 
accomplished much in Palestine, however, the Jews matched and ultimately surpassed this 
progress by their own exertions.”10 While the British were the overarching power in mandatory 
Palestine, Jews were able to create their own prosperous community through innovations in 	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agriculture and technology. There were different departments organized for political affairs, 
immigration, labor, colonization, education, and health; the political department, for example, 
remained in touch with the high commissioner in Jerusalem on major issues affecting the Balfour 
Declaration, while the immigration department undertook the placement of Jewish newcomers 
and advised the mandatory on work opportunities.11 While these developments took place, 
Zionist leaders continued to advocate for the creation of an independent Jewish homeland, 
strengthening the relationship between the mandatory administration and Jewish governments. 
Some Zionist leaders argued that “…Britain was obliged now to follow the Zionist Executive’s 
recommendation and open the doors of Palestine for an immediate and massive resettlement of 
hundreds of thousands of Jews” while others “…regarded any such maximal interpretation as a 
fantasy.”12  
As a result of the growing prosperity and success, Jewish immigration increased—26,000 
new Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine between 1919 and 1923, 63,000 between 1924 and 
1926, and 175,000 immigrants between 1932 and 1939.13 The increases in Jewish immigration, 
however, began to alarm the Arabs because the increased presence of Jews in the land lowered 
their hopes of obtaining sovereignty and independence. Arabs had advocated for their 
sovereignty and had attempted to negotiate some form of deal with the British for the past few 
years, but their requests went unattended. Consequently, Arabs led communal disturbances in 
which both Jews and Arabs were killed.14 For example, the Arab Revolts of 1936-1939 were 
“sparked, on 19 April, by rumours in Jaffa that two Arab Palestinians had been killed by Jews in 
adjoining Jewish Tel Aviv. Arab mobs then turned on Jews and riots continued for three more 
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days…”15 By mid-October, the 1936 uprisings came to a temporary end, resulting in a total of 
some 1,300 casualties.16   
One of the reasons why the revolt occurred was because the nonstop Jewish immigration 
to Palestine which, in turn, was decreasing the chances of Arab sovereignty. As was drafted in a 
statement for the House of Commons in 1947:   
For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the 
independence which has now been attained by every other Arab state; and that, in 
accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be 
free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of 
the Jewish National Home as jeopardizing the attainment of national independence by the 
Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab states desire; and they are therefore unwilling to 
contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the 
creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine. 17   
 
The Arab revolt in 1936 and disturbances of this sort led to the Peel Commission in 1937, a 
commission that attempted to resolve the tensions that were at play between the Arabs and the 
Jews. Following the Peel Commission was the Woodhead Commission in 1938, and the 
implementation of the White Paper of 1939, which limited Jewish immigration to a total of 
75,000 more Jews until 1944, during which no more Jews would be allowed to enter Palestine.  
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 
(I) PEEL COMMISSION, 1937 
As a response to the escalating tensions between the Jews and the Arabs and, more 
specifically, the Arab revolt of 1936, the British formed the Peel Commission in late 1936, which 
aimed to create nominally independent Jewish and Arab states in order to alleviate rising 
tensions between both peoples. The Commission was chaired by Lord Robert Peel, a seventy-
year-old man who had been a previous secretary of state for India. Other members included, Sir 	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Horace Rumbold, a previous British high commissioner in Constantinople and ambassador to 
Berlin who was the vice-chairman of the Commission, Dr. Reginald Coupland, professor of 
colonial history at Oxford and “tenacious advocate of unorthodox ideas,” and other professional 
diplomats and experienced jurists.18 The Commissioners stayed in Palestine for two months and 
held thirty public and forty private hearings.19 From the onset, the commissioners knew that the 
path to a solution would not be easy—they had arrived in Palestine in the middle of escalating 
tensions.  As Lord Peel once explained, “…the Jewish claim to Palestine on grounds of historical 
and religious connections and the Arab claim on grounds of 13 centuries of continuous 
occupation had validity and thus the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine was not one of 
right against wrong but that of right against right.”20  
The Peel Commission did not introduce the topic of partition until its fifty-first meeting, 
during which Chaim Weizmann, a president of the World Zionist Organization, gave 
testimony.21 Initially, the Peel Commission viewed partition as a last measure; eventually, 
however, Weizmann’s proposals to partition convinced the Commission (see map 2A). Thus, in 
July 1937, the Royal Commission Report was issued—a document consisting of 404 pages full 
of maps and statistics of the territory summarizing the views of both Jews and Arabs, detailing 
the accomplishments of the Jewish National Home, and containing a suggestion of curtailment of 
Jewish immigration to a limit of 12,000 annually for the next five years.22 As Sachar explains,  
…the report’s proposal was for Palestine and Transjordan to be divided into three 
regions: a Jewish state comprising, essentially, the coastal plain and Galilee; a much 
larger Arab state embracing the rest of Palestine and Transjordan; and a permanently 
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mandated British enclave including the Jerusalem-Bethlehem promontory, with a corridor 
to the sea and British bases on Lake Galilee and the Guld of Aqaba.23 
 
Upon its release, the report was rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. The difference between 
the rejections, however, was that the Jews accepted the idea of partition, just not this particular 
plan’s principles. The main reason why Zionists rejected this plan was that it did not five the 
Jewish state enough of the land. As a result, Jews regarded the Peel proposal as a temporary 
arrangement that could lead to a better solution in the future and, eventually, their own Jewish 
state. In the eyes of some, having a bit of the land—even if it was not enough or the best part of 
the land—was better than having nothing. As Bregman argues, the plan was “…a stepping-off 
ground for further advance, and that after the formation of a large Jewish army, in the wake of 
the establishment of a Jewish state on the land allotted by the Peel proposal, the Jews could 
abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine.”24  
The Arabs, however, rejected the proposal and the notion of partition entirely, 
“…declaring that Palestine was an integral part of the Arabian homeland and that no part of it 
should be alienated.”25  The Arabs were very reluctant to accept anything but their own state and 
opposed the establishment of the royal commission from the outset.26 The Arabs did not want a 
Jewish state because they perceived the existence of it as an obstacle to their independence and 
control of the entire territory, and they argued that the Arabs were still the majority. The Arabs 
began to view “Zionism as a British instrument” and considered all activity part of the 
imperialist plan.27 As a result, the refusal to compromise was the Arab way of showing that they 
wanted no more manipulation and that they still hoped for the British promises of sovereignty 	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and independence. As a result, there were high levels of opposition and rebellion to partition, 




















Map 2A – Peel Plan for Partition of Palestine, 1937 




(II) THE INTERIM YEARS (1937-1947) 
By October 1937, violence erupted once again—the Arabs were furious and did not 
hesitate to show their rage. From July to November 1938, the uprising was at its high point, 
producing high numbers of casualties from all sides, including the British. As a result, the British 
sent more troops into Palestine, and the Haganah—the Jewish underground defense force—
mcontinued to grow and develop.  
That year, the Woodhead Commission sought to “…determine the methods by which 
partition might be carried out and to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish 
states”28 that had been discussed in the Peel Commission. The chairman of the commission was 
Sir John Woodhead, a “civilian official who had served in the Anglo-Indian administration,” and 
two of his three colleagues were members of the Indian Civil Service.29 Since the Arabs opposed 
and had already dismissed the idea of partition, it is no surprise that they also opposed the 
Woodhead Commission and refused to make an effort to consult the commissioners. If the Arabs 
did not agree to the principle of partition, it was clear that they were not going to agree to any 
plan that included partition. Instead, it was only the British and the Jews who had conversations 
related to the partition of Palestine. While most of the Zionist leadership had rejected the Peel 
Plan, many Zionist groups agreed to the idea of partition, which is why they made an effort to 
negotiate with the British. On November 9, 1938, the Woodhead Report—a 310 page document 
containing maps and alternative partition suggestions, and stating that the Peel plan was 
unfeasible—was submitted to Parliament.30 The Jews, however, also rejected this partition 
scheme, as the territories allotted to them were too small. 
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 By August 1939, Palestine had experienced high amounts of bloodshed—as Sachar puts 
it: “The Arabs plainly had mastered a crucial lesson, that violence on behalf of their rights in the 
Holy Land was effective diplomacy.”31 Arabs resorted to violence to show their opposition to 
partition and the “imperialist agenda.” By the end of the revolts in August 1939, the toll in 
Palestine was 6,768 casualties—2394 Jews, 3,764 Arabs, and 610 British.32 The violence, 
however, did not dissuade Jews from migrating to Palestine; Nazi anti-Semitic persecution in 
Europe, and geopolitical and survival reasons dictated their future. In fact, “…the boundaries of 
any future Jewish state would be determined by the practical evidence of Jewish habitation,”33 
which meant that Jews needed to keep moving to Palestine. Most importantly, the worsening 
situation in Europe left no other choice for the Jews but to move to Palestine and escape the Nazi 
terrors. 
Wanting to appease Arab requests, yet failing to see the unfathomable consequences that 
the Holocaust would bring, the British enacted the White Paper in May 1939—a policy which 
limited Jewish immigration to Palestine with the purpose of maintaining a balance of the 
population demographics and improving the British bargaining position with the Arabs. In 
addition to limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine, the White Paper placed restrictions on the 
existing Jewish population in Palestine. As the Board of Deputies of British Jews later on 
expressed,  
These restrictions meant that the Jewish population of Palestine was to be crystallized as 
a permanent minority, and seemed to put an end to Jewish efforts and hopes for the 
effective development of the Jewish National Home. Future policy in regard to Palestine 
must clearly begin with the abrogation of the White Paper.34  
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The White Paper was a way to please the Arabs and guarantee them that there would not be a 
Jewish majority in Palestine due to its limiting effects, yet it prevented Jews from accessing the 
land, and thus facilitated their extermination since they had nowhere to go. Even after the 
Holocaust, one of the biggest problems was “…the absorption of the 1,250,000 European 
[Jewish] survivors, the overwhelmingly majority of whom were desperately pressing against the 
gates of Palestine. Only the immediate establishment of a Jewish state offered the prospect of 
doing that.”35 Immigration reforms limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine remained in effect 
until the end of the British mandate.  
The Holocaust made clear that it was necessary for the Jewish people to have their own 
homeland in order to ensure their survival. The Holocaust sped up the urgency of many Jews to 
want to migrate to Palestine. Those who survived remained aliens in European territory, with 
nothing but their painful memories. Their only hope was to migrate to the land that had once 
belonged to the Jewish people. As one memorandum from the Colonial Office submitted to the 
British in 1945 put it: “…tens of thousands of survivors of Nazi concentration and labour camps, 
who, in spite of all their past sufferings and present distress, refuse to return to their former 
countries of residence, which are now but mass grave-yards of their fellow-Jews, and are 
determined to work out their own salvation in Palestine.”36 The ultimate result of Holocaust 
atrocities gave the final push to revoke the White Paper and to allow Jewish immigration to 
Palestine once again. As the Jewish Agency advocated in a 1945 memorandum: “Now that the 
war is over, the Jewish people can no longer tolerate the continuance of the White Paper, which 
closes the door of the Jewish National Home against the survivors of the Nazi extermination 
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camp.”37 Thus, the Jewish argument to create the state of Israel was grounded in the idea of 
creating a safe haven in which Jews could feel at home and not be persecuted, further 
exacerbated by the aftermath of the Holocaust.  
As the Anglo-Jewish Association stated in a memorandum from 1945: “We firmly 
believe that the only settlement which will ensure a lasting solution of the problem of the 
homelessness of the Jewish people and remove the mistrust […] is the establishment of Palestine 
as a Jewish State.”38 The Zionist movement was dedicated to the establishment of a safe haven 
for the Jewish people. As the Jewish Agency explained in 1945: “…the country [Palestine] in its 
present state was their creation and it was the only place where Jews have a home created by 
themselves to which they had belonged through centuries in their hearts.”39 Moreover, “It is only 
in Palestine, where the Jewish Community offers them a warm welcome and has plans ready for 
their absorption and rehabilitation, that the Jewish survivors can rebuild their lives and join with 
their fellow Jews in making their contribution as Jews to the reconstruction and progress 
envisaged in the new world order.” 40  
Jewish Argument 
Claim to the land in the Zionist argument was founded on the idea of finding a safe haven 
and home for the Jews; it was not a Zionist aim to colonize and rule over the Arabs, but rather to 
create a Jewish homeland in which Jews could be safe from discrimination and feel a sense of 
belonging. As David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, stated in 1945: “In returning 
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to our historic homeland we cannot, nor do we wish to take away anything which [the Arabs] 
have; we want merely to build; to rebuild the desolate lands. We want to create new 
opportunities in agriculture, in industry, in sea trade and, by creating them, to increase the 
population by Jews who want to return to their homeland.”41 The desire of the Jewish people to 
have a Jewish state was so strong that even some Zionists made known that “Jewish Palestine 
will be happy to cooperate with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab peoples in a 
common effort to bring greater prosperity to the whole Middle East.”42  
While the Jews would do anything to obtain their own state, the fact remained that they 
were also full of contradictions. For example, Ben-Gurion’s argument in regard to population 
states,  
This is really the crux of the problem: Are the Jews to remain a minority in Palestine as 
they are throughout the world? We firmly believe that history has decreed that we should 
cooperate with Great Britain, but the British people must realize that the Jews of 
Palestine, and the millions outside who have set their hearts on Palestine, will never agree 
that the return of Jews to their historic homeland should be dependent on anyone else’s 
consent; that Jews in Palestine should remain a minority; and that they should be 
deprived of statehood.43 
 
There was a question of creating a Jewish homeland while simultaneously living with a non-
Jewish population. On the one hand, Jews were willing to live side by side with their Arab 
cousins, but on the other hand, Jews wanted a place that they could call their own. After all, Jews 
needed a safe refuge in which they could avoid the high level of anti-Semitism that was plaguing 
Europe. Moreover, the Arabs wanted nothing but their own state as well, arguing that “Any other 
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solution [would] threaten peace throughout Palestine and Middle East.”44 As a result, the chaos 
in mandatory Palestine did not emerge from a vacuum, but rather from many years of repressed 
tensions that exploded as more and more schemes were proposed. 
The War in Europe had proven to be enormously costly, and the British were coming to 
terms with the fact that their empire was losing power. The British found themselves unable to 
keep up with their expenses and thus needed to make changes.  As a result, efficiency and benefit 
for the British themselves were more important than attending to the needs for peace in the 
Middle East. After all, as Lucy Chester argues, “[b]ecause the power of the British empire after 
World War II was declining, it was all the more important for the empire to convey a façade of 
control.”45 As is stated in a 1948 report for the partition of Palestine from the Foreign Office 
Records: “The imperialist circles of Britain regard national strife as the best means of achieving 
their own specific aims.”46 The complexity and mess of the conflict, and the inability of Britain 
to satisfy both powers, and Britain’s poor economic conditions led it to transfer its responsibility 
of reaching some form of solution somewhere else—to the United Nations. 
In one last effort, the British made a final offer to the Jews and the Arabs through the 
Morrison-Grady scheme in 1946, which called for federalization under total British trusteeship. 
Once again, however, the scheme appeared to benefit only the British and left the Arabs and the 
Jews as a second priority. Consequently, both the Jews and the Arabs rejected the plan and, 
consequently, the British turned to other means. In that year, the Anglo-American Commission 
of Inquiry was created with the purpose of arriving at a solution by examining political and 
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social conditions, Jewish immigration, and by consulting Jewish and Arab representatives. After 
years of repression under British rule and not being granted their wishes, however, it was only 
natural for the Arabs to reject all but a state of their own in which they could be truly free of any 
form of foreign rule. As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a Memorandum in 
1945: “…the certainty of Arab hostility to partition is so clear, and the consequences of 
permanently alienating the Arabs would be so serious, that partition must on this ground alone be 
regarded as a desperate remedy.”47 
(III) UN COMMISSION, 1947 
The Middle East had reached a dead end; there was no more room for negotiation 
between Jews and Arabs and, consequently, the future of Palestine rested with the members of 
the UN and the Great Powers. On 15 February 1947, Great Britain turned the Palestine issue over 
to the United Nations, during which the British abandoned the issues affecting Palestine.48 In 
order to obtain a more neutral body of nations that would have a say in the future of Palestine, 
the United Nations created UNSCOP (the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), a 
special UN body that consisted of eleven nations including Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, India, Iran, and the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. UNSCOP 
had full authority to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine. 
With the authority to do so, UNSCOP decided the fate of Palestine and determined that:  
the mandate must be ended and independence granted at the earliest practicable date; the 
political structure of the new state or states should be ‘basically democratic;’ the 
economic unity of Palestine must be maintained; the security of the holy places and 
access to them assured; the General Assembly should carry out immediately an 
arrangement for solving the urgent problem of a quarter-million Jewish DPs in Europe.49  
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On 14 June 1947, six diplomats, four jurists and a professor arrived in Jerusalem and stayed for 
five weeks and met Jewish representatives.50 Interestingly, Britain abstained from participating 
in the commission discussions, for fear of further provoking the Arabs and losing oil deals and 
for bitterness against the Jews for shaming Britain through Zionist propaganda.51  
 On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly resolution to partition Palestine was 
proposed and approved by a vote of thirty-three to thirteen, giving it the necessary two-thirds 
majority to pass52 (see map 2B). Under the final plan and the majority recommendation, the Arab 
state would consist of 4,500 square miles, 804,000 Arabs, and 10,000 Jews, while the Jewish 
state would consist of 5,500 miles, 538,000 Jews, and 397,000 Arabs. In addition, both would be 
linked in an economic union and to share a joint currency, joint railroads, and highways, as well 
as postal, telephone, and telegraphic services.53 Moreover, 
The Jewish state was located in the coastal plain along the Mediterranean Sea from about 
Ashkelon to Acre, the eastern part of the area of the Galilee, and much of the Negev 
Desert. The Arab state included the remainder of the territory of the mandate west of the 
Jordan River, except for Jerusalem and the immediate area around it, which were 
included in the international area [controlled by the UN].54 
 
The implementation of this plan, however, was not as swift as many had hoped. 
Because of this religious attachment to Jerusalem from both the Jews and the Arabs, the 
UN commission agreed on having a Jerusalem state—which would be an international zone 
controlled by the UN. Jerusalem’s neutrality, the British thought, would reduce the tensions 
between both sides. After all, as the Arabs argued in a report regarding repercussions in Palestine 
and in neighbouring Arab countries: “…no Moslem Holy Place of any real importance will be 
included in the Jewish State. The true religious issue centres round Jerusalem, the third most 	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holy city of Islam, and the fear of this city passing into Jewish control will be finally removed by 
the creation of the Jerusalem state.”55 On the other hand, however, as Englishman Sir G. Gater 
explained, “Jewish Palestine without Jerusalem would be a body without a soul. Jerusalem has 
throughout the ages been the spiritual centre of the Jews, dispersed as they were over the face of 
the earth…”56 Clearly, Jerusalem was key to both peoples and thus an area of endless debate.57  
Most states that voted against the resolution were Muslim and thus supported the Arab 
cause. As Sachar explains, “During the entire mandatory period, Arab leaders had refused to 
cooperate with the British in any scheme of national autonomy as long as the Jews were similarly 
included.”58 Not handling this partition plan any differently as they did with the British, the 
Arabs continued to be reluctant to all partition schemes. As was summarized in a telegram from 
the Foreign Office reporting a conversation on Palestine between Mr. Bevin, the British 
ambassador, and the United States Ambassador in London on the 22nd May: “Palestine was a 
question of deep concern to the countries of the Middle East, to Pakistan and to other countries 
with Moslem inhabitants.”59 Months before the UN Partition plan was released or even created, 
Arabs opposed the proceedings. As a note on Proceedings of the Meeting of the Arab Premiers in 
Cairo from December 8 to 17, 1947 reads, “The general impression gained by conversations with 
all the delegations to the conference of Arab premiers… is that there is complete unanimity of 
view that resistance to Partition must be offered and that fighting and bloodshed is inevitable.”60 
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However, the Zionists thought otherwise. Contrary to what Arabs believed, Zionists 
argued that partition would not bring forth more bloodshed and pain but rather economic 
prosperity for all. As David Ben-Gurion stated in a set of minutes dated around 1944 or 1945:  
We have no quarrel with the Arabs. In returning to our historic homeland we cannot, nor 
do we wish to take away anything which they have; we want merely to build; to rebuild 
the desolate lands. We want to create new opportunities in agriculture, in industry, in sea 
trade and, by creating them, to increase the population by Jews who want to return to 
their homeland.61 
 
Contrary to popular belief, “…the numbers of Arabs who benefitted from Jewish immigration 
more than compensated for rare injustices. Indeed, in the Middle East, it was Palestine alone that 
resulted in Arab immigration exceeding emigration.”62 Between 1922 and 1945, approximately 
100,000 Arabs entered the country from neighboring lands. The influx, Sachar argues, “could be 
traced in some measure to the orderly government provided by the British; but far more, 
certainly, to the economic opportunities made possible by Jewish settlement.”63  
As Ben-Gurion indicated, the priority of many Jews was not to colonize Palestine and the 
Arabs living there—despite the fact that it must have felt as such to the Arabs—but to create a 
Jewish homeland and to encourage a growing influx of Jewish immigrants. Nevertheless, the 
Arabs were more hostile toward the Jews and the British after seventeen years of the mandate. 
As a result, “the UN commission concluded that this was a political conflict between 
irreconcilable aspirations and that territorial surgery was the only solution.”64 Jews did not only 
oppose the partition scheme, on the contrary, they accepted it quite openly. To the Jews, the UN 
plan was the most percentage of territory that they had ever been offered.   
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Map 2B – The UN Partition Plan, 1947 






Factors at Play (1940-1946) 
The Peel partition plan did not work in 1937, but it did lead to discussion within the next 
ten years. Factors that influenced the Peel partition proposal were accentuated and further 
discussed. Religious contiguity played a role even with the fluctuation of population 
demographics.  For example, as an Extract from the Report of Ministerial Committee on 
Palestine from 20 December 1943 reads,  
The inclusion of Jaffa in the Jewish State is dictated by considerations of practicability 
rather than of desirability. Jaffa-Tel Aviv is, in fact, one town, and it is really more 
correct to speak of Jaffa-Tel Aviv as a town of 235,030 inhabitants—167,580 Jews and 
67,450 Arabs—than it is to speak of Jaffa as a separate town on 91,870 inhabitants—
66,700 Arabs and 25,170 Jews. 65  
 
Moreover, the Galilee, Central Judaea, South Gaza, and North-West Beersheva were to be 
awarded to Arabs because there was a larger Arab population.66 A problem with these requests 
was the fact that dividing along religious lines would make a pockmarked state due to the fact 
that populations were not entirely allocated by religion. Furthermore, a pockmarked state would 
have forced each religious population to have to travel across each other’s territory to reach 
another area of religious contiguity. 
  In addition to religious identity, a large part of the discussion for splitting up the territory 
was associated with economic prosperity by area. With the rise of Jewish immigration, there was 
also an increase of economic prosperity. As the Colonial Office Records dealing with the Arab 
areas from 1943 reads,  
On the experience acquired in Palestine during the last 65 years, Jews claim to be able to 
cultivate a great part of the lands which both Arabs and Government consider 	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uncultivable, whether in the mountains of Judea or Galilee, on the sandy wastes of the 
sea-shores, on the steppes of the Negev, or in the valley of the Jordan.67  
 
This cultivation action led to territorial and economic affluence for the Jews. This affluence, in 
turn, strongly influenced the train of thought of the boundary commissions. As was recorded in a 
report from the Ministerial Committee on Palestine from the Colonial Office Records regarding 
the inclusion of Haifa in the Jewish State, dated December 20th 1943: 
Haifa is an important centre of Jewish industry; Arab industrial development in the city 
and its vicinity cannot compare with that achieved and in process of being achieved by 
the Jews. Any division of territory which placed the industries of the two large Jewish 
industrial centres, Tel Aviv and Haifa, in different States, and possibly under different 
tariffs, would lead to incongruous results and be most difficult to defend. For this reason, 
we consider the inclusion of Haifa in the Jewish State to be the only practical solution.68  
 
The report discussed the prosperity that Jewish influence brought upon cities, but it also 
discussed what occurred in Arab areas. Because the Arab areas were so small, the report 
mentioned that “The Arab areas will certainly show a deficit” and that they should be “joined 
direct to a Greater Syria…with the whole that the excess cost of their maintenance should not 
prove too great a burden for the larger state.”69  While these points were important to consider, 
the Arab desire for the whole of Palestine persisted and was not being addressed. Furthermore, 
dividing along economic lines would cut off religious communities and create two states that 
would be very difficult to navigate and preserve because of how populations were dispersed. 
AFTERMATH 
On 14 May 1948 Israel declared its independence and the British withdrew as a 
mandatory authority. The lack of an overarching authority allowed for the Jews to adopt the 1947 
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UN Resolution despite the fact that the Arabs had no agreed to it. Nevertheless, the Jewish state 
produced a declaration of independence, which, interestingly, did not mention the boundaries, 
adding to the overall ambiguity of the partition process. As Bregman adds, “Ben-Gurion failed to 
mention the boundaries of the Jewish state, presumably because he did not wish to rule out the 
possibility that Israeli forces would expand these boundaries beyond what the UN had allotted to 
the Jews in November 1947.”70 To the Jews, the declaration of their state was a victory; at last, 
they obtained the Jewish safe haven for which they had fought for so long. Just a few minutes 
after Ben-Gurion declared independence, the United States recognized the new state of Israel.  
To the Arabs, however, the declaration of the Jewish state made them furious. Indeed, the 
following day, all Arab nations surrounding the newly founded state attacked Israel, inciting the 
War of Independence. The greater problem, however, was the issue of Jerusalem; the UN 
Partition plan had granted the Jerusalem state neither to the Jews or the Arabs. As a result, both 
sides desired to have control of the city and engaged in a continuous, bloody war for years to 
come. As a consequence of war, Israel won more territory thereafter; in fact, “three weeks after 
the establishment of the state of Israel… Israel was in control of much more territory than she 
could have hoped for.”71 The lack of a formal agreement, the lack of an overarching authority, 
the lack of dialogue, and the strong intervention of foreign powers produced a chaotic, messy 
outcome.
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CHAPTER 3: COMPARISON 
Historians have closely examined the partitions of British India and mandatory Palestine; 
however, they have done so in isolation. Very few historians have analyzed both cases side by 
side even though the partitions of both regions share common factors. For example, both 
geopolitical conflicts are centered on religious differences, both regions were under British rule, 
and the newly founded states in both regions achieved independence only ten months apart from 
each other. Despite the similarities, only the partition of British India was able to produce two 
states that, despite the violence, remained cartographically stable, as opposed to the Middle East 
where the boundaries kept consistently changing.  
This chapter analyzes possible factors that contributed to the cartographic success of 
British India’s partition. Each section in this chapter juxtaposes both India and Palestine in order 
to In order to further understand the partitions and to accentuate the importance of these key 
components that influenced India’s cartographic stability. The factors examined in this section 
include: the presence (or lack) of an initial mutual agreement between all parties; speed and 
secrecy; size of territory; significance (cultural and religious) of territory; the form of British 
rule, which compares Britain’s colonial rule in India to the British mandate in Palestine; 
immigration, which compares the impact of static versus fluctuating populations; and domestic 
versus international interests, which describes the relative influence of outside players. By 
juxtaposing India and Palestine, as opposed to studying them in isolation, this chapter seeks to 





FACTOR 1: INITIAL MUTUAL AGREEMENT (OR LACK THEREOF) 
 The initial mutual agreement to partition, or lack thereof, was one of the most important 
factors that contributed to each region’s cartographic fate. In India, this initial agreement set the 
base for the rest of the partition processes that took place; that is, the League and the Congress 
progressed their partition processes by adhering to the common goal to which they had agreed on 
3 June 1947. Without this initial mutual understanding, there would have been no foundation for 
the numerous meetings and processes that would follow, making all sides unlikely to reach a 
final and mutual agreement, as was the case in mandatory Palestine. Indeed, the inability to 
establish a common base that determined what both sides demanded—as opposed to never 
clarifying those fundamental needs—made the numerous commissions and proposals throughout 
the partition process quite pointless. In this section, I explain the impact of having (and not 
having) an initial mutual agreement and how that agreement established the tone and direction of 
what would come.  
 The Congress and the League agreed to have two sovereign states no matter what the 
boundaries were to become in British India. There was an element of agreement prior to partition 
planning that significantly impacted the outcome of the geopolitical situation. That is, the strong 
desire to have two independent states encouraged both sides to commit to designing, defining, 
and adhering to the final state boundaries even during times of high tension. The presence of a 
legitimate contract—which both sides accepted and signed on 3 June, 1947—held both sides 
accountable for creating an independent India and Pakistan and, consequently, committed both 
sides to cooperating with and completing the overall process until independence was declared. 
Additionally, the agreement established the foundation for all the commissions, negotiations, and 
talks that occurred from its inception to Independence Day on 15 August 1947.  
65 
Even during times of disagreement, the League, the Congress, and the British remained 
focused on the core mission: the creation of two separate states. As was stated in the Central 
Partition Council on July 24, 1947: 
Both Governments have pledged themselves to accept the awards of the Boundary 
Commissions, whatever these may be. The Boundary Commissions are already in 
session; if they are to discharge their duties satisfactorily, it is essential that they should 
not be hampered by public speeches or writings threatening boycott by direct action, or 
otherwise interfering with their work. Both Governments will take appropriate steps to 
secure this end; and, as soon as the awards are announced, both Governments will 
enforce them impartially and at once.1 
 
Even with popular violence, the overall levels of cooperation remained quite high. 
Indeed, one of the things the commissions cooperated on and discussed was how to deal with 
possible future violence. As Viceroy Mountbatten stated in one of his August personal reports: 
“There are continued rumours that the Sikhs will make trouble after the Boundary Commission’s 
award has been announced, but there is evidence that both the new Dominions intend to be very 
firm in dealing with disturbances in the future...”2 The high level of cooperation between the 
Congress, the League, and the British throughout the partition process, and the ability to deal 
with the violence of the time did not decrease the violence that came after partition, but it did 
allow for a greater threshold for conversation, dialogue, and cooperation.   
  Unlike the League and Congress, Jews, Muslims, and Christian Palestinians negotiating 
for Palestine did not have a preliminary contract that committed them to the partitioning of the 
territory. Rather, partition commissions and negotiation attempts occurred before all sides had 
reached an initial mutual agreement to partition. Initially, each side wanted all of Palestine to be 
a state of its own. However, the Peel report in 1937 changed the scene; while both Jews and 
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Arabs rejected the Peel report, the Jews had accepted the principle of partition while the Arabs 
completely rejected it because of their initial desire to be a sovereign and independent people 
ruling over what they perceived as rightfully theirs. Thereafter, Jews were willing to meet and 
negotiate with the British commissioners. The problem, however, was that these negotiations 
were taking place without the Arabs due to the fact that partition was not an option they wanted.  
As a result, the more commissions that were created, the more complicated and unlikely 
the path to partition became. The lack of a preliminary agreement, as was present in the India 
case, prevented the Jews and Arabs from reaching a viable solution in which both parties would 
benefit. Rather, the Palestine question remained unanswered and boundary commissions 
consistently redrew possible boundary options that could never be fully satisfactory to one side 
or the other. The level of reluctance to confront one another got so high that, as Sachar explains,  
“When the Arabs refused to sit in the same room with the Jews, arrangements were made for the 
two delegations to enter the palace by separate entrances.”3 The lack of an initial agreement and 
establishment of common goals affected the outcome of Palestine’s partition.  
The reason as to why this initial agreement was crucial in India’s partition process is 
because it committed all parties and guaranteed stability between them until the final boundaries 
were determined and implemented. As a result, the high level of cooperation and the productive 
conversations that were present in the partition process of India were certainly not the same in 
the partition processes of Palestine. Although there were more attempts to partition Palestine 
after 1937, the fact remains that those attempts were futile because a foundational agreement to 
partition was never established, resulting in heightened tensions between Jews and Arabs. 
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FACTOR 2: SPEED AND SECRECY  
 Speed and secrecy also played an essential role in the partition efforts because they 
determined the available debate time, proposal time, and the threshold for outside influences, 
which had an overall effect on the end results. The levels of speed and secrecy were high in India 
but low in Palestine. The opposite levels of speed and secrecy led to different results in each 
case. In this section, I explain how the differing levels of speed and secrecy in each region 
contributed to the different outcomes of each case. 
As late as three months prior to independence, partition of the subcontinent remained an 
idea rather than a reality; Mountbatten still believed that British India was going to remain 
united. As Mountbatten wrote in April 1947 in one of his personal reports: “I regard Jinnah as a 
psychopathic case; in fact until I had met him I would not have thought it possible that a man 
with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve 
or hold down so powerful a position.”4 Originally, Mountbatten did not deem the partition of 
British India viable because the idea was very new and because India had remained united for so 
long. The drive to partition the territory was not a movement that had been present for decades; 
rather, all conversation pertaining to partition and the implementation of new boundaries rose 
very quickly in mid-1947 in the context of intensifying the territorial tensions.  
It was not until Tuesday, the 12th of August, that Radcliffe informed Mountbatten that his 
awards would be ready by noon the following day5—only three days before the partition itself. 
Moreover, award decisions were not publicized until 15 August 1947, the day of the partition, 
because “The boundary commission’s deliberations were supposed to be secret, impartial and 	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isolated from political pressure.”6 Holding these commission meetings secret prevented people 
outside the commissions from having a personal opinion for the duration of the process. This 
level of secrecy, therefore, prevented disputes and interference from both domestic and 
international players, which allowed for the process to run more hastily in order to create the 
boundaries. Even before there was an official Chairman, whose main function was to decide 
points of disagreement, members of the Commissions had started to work independently in order 
to accelerate the process.7 In fact, “It was not until the summer of 1947 that British and South 
Asian decision-makers began serious discussions about the format and procedure of a boundary 
commission.”8 
A large part of the ambiguity that occurred had to do with the high speed of the overall 
process. Decisions in regard to where the boundaries would fall were made hastily. However, the 
high speed of the overall process left little time for prolonged debate and hesitation. As 
Mountbatten once stated, “This [was] no time for bickering, much less for the continuation in 
any shape or form of the disorders and lawlessness of the past few months…”9 As Nehru further 
agreed, “there are all manner of factors which have to be considered. It is better, therefore, to 
leave the matter to the Boundary commission itself. They will, no doubt, take into consideration 
all factors they consider relevant.”10 Because the boundaries were drawn in under three months, 
there was not enough time for debate and alterations extensive enough to delay the process.  
The fast pace of the process also allowed for snap decisions. On 12 June, Nehru replied to 
Mountbatten’s request for working principles for the boundary commission, “…making it clear 
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that Congress had intentionally proposed vague terms of reference in hopes that this leeway 
would allow the commission to work more quickly, with relatively few limitations to consider 
and a relatively simple mandate to follow.”11 Fast decisions did not necessarily mean bad 
decisions; in fact, the rashness of it all allowed for less tensions and debate between political 
parties. Indeed, if all parties had a say, decisions would not have been made as quickly because 
there would have been lingering debate on particular details that would never have pleased both 
sides, as proved to be the case in Palestine. 
As Viceroy Mountbatten explained in his July-August personal reports: “Friction is more 
intense and much time has to be devoted to oiling the bearings and pulling spanners out of the 
works. I am more than ever convinced that if the date of transfer had been 1st October there 
would have been serious risk of a complete breakdown before that date.”12 However, extreme 
violence came right after partition occurred. The difference, however, was that the British were 
no longer in power and could no longer be directly blamed. As a result, Mountbatten’s argument 
was more of a pretext; he argued that speed would decrease violence, but that argument was just 
a means to protect the British image as an authoritative and imperial power, and to avoid 
problems. 
Unlike the India case, the partition of Palestine was not a three-month planning event.  
Rather, the partition of this territory emerged as a result of years of effort from the Zionist 
movement to create a Jewish state, Arab pleas for independence, and from years of negotiations 
between international players like France, the British, and the United States. Unlike the partition 
of India, the partition of Palestine was the focus of several commissions, such as the Peel 
Commission in 1937, the Whitehead Commission in 1938, in addition to planning schemes such 	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as the Morrison-Grady scheme in 1946, and the Anglo-American Committee of 1946 prior to the 
final UN partition plan in 1947. Ironically, the heavy emphasis on the creation of boundary 
commissions and partition plans, the lengthy amount of dialogue, and the transparency of it all to 
the leaders of all sides, made the solution-finding process lengthier, messier, and less likely to 
succeed. 
With the Peel Commission in 1937, the idea of partition was present in people’s minds 
for at least a decade before it actually occurred. The Peel report planted seeds in people’s minds 
in regard as to what the partitioned territory could look like, which gave people the time to think 
about partition in more detail. The problem, however, was that the more people thought about 
partition, the less likely it was for the Arabs and the Jews to reach a solution. In fact, the Peel 
Report alienated the Arabs, as it hinted that they never would get the complete sovereignty the 
British had once promised, once again contradicting British promises. As Sachar explains, 
“...attacks on the Peel Report increased in frequency and vehemence throughout the Arab 
World… In Egypt the Moslem Brotherhood initiated fund-raising campaigns on behalf of the 
Palestine Arabs. There were mass demonstrations in Baghdad, a one-day strike in Mecca and 
Medina, a protest to the British….”13  Simultaneously, the Report made the Jews more hopeful of 
finally creating an official Jewish state, which made the Zionist movement even stronger.  
The final, implemented plan, the UN partition plan from 29 November 1947, took only 
about six months to create; however, that six-month period of planning did not come without 
precedent. Conversations that took place after the Peel Commission became more complicated 
over time, examining religious sites and formulated ever-more detailed arguments. Indeed, there 
are a number of Palestine Ministerial Committee Reports and Colonial Office records from 1943 
and 1944 that deal with further alterations proposed for the boundaries of succession states. One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sachar. A History of Israel: 209-210 
71 
of these documents, for example, deals with specific religious sites—which the Peel Report and 
the Whitehead Commission did not discuss much—and brings in the Catholic population, which 
did not play a large role in the process. As was recorded in a Palestine Policy report from the 
Colonial Office Records in 1943-1944: “The main reason for transferring Mount Tabor from the 
Jewish State is that, as the traditional site of the Transfiguration [of Jesus], its inclusion in Jewish 
territory would give offence to Roman Catholics (there is a large Franciscan church on the 
summit), and Protestants alike, whereas there would be no objection to its inclusion in an Arab 
state, where is had remained for a millennium.”14  
As consequence for the amount of time available for discussions, what started as failed 
British promises became a heated, large-scale geopolitical conflict. World players began to get 
involved, further polarizing both sides. For example, a World-Inter-Parliamentary Congress of 
Arab and Moslem Countries met for the Defense of Palestine in Cairo in October 1938, which 
significantly prefigured later rivalries on the Palestine problem.15 It can be argued, therefore, that 
the lack of speed and secrecy caused more tensions to develop and made the conversation open 
to far too many outside players.  
The high speed of the India case prevented high levels of disagreement because there was 
no time for debate. The tight deadline to create and implement a partition plan left no choice for 
the boundary commission in India but to work speedily. In order to ensure high levels of speed, 
the commissions also worked in high levels of secrecy in order to prevent outsiders from sharing 
their opinion and slowing down the process.  In contrast, the concept of partition lingered in 
Palestine for a little too long; from the moment it was first introduced in the Peel Commission in 
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1937 to the UN Resolution plan in 1947, the idea of partition into a Jewish and an Arab state had 
been around for ten years. As a result, Jews, Arabs, and the British had the opportunity to think 
of details and of ideas that made partition more complicated to reach. In addition, the 
transparency of the British in presenting their partition proposals to the Arabs and the Jews—as 
opposed to not asking for their opinions at all, as the British did in India—contributed to 
Palestine’s failed partition efforts.   
FACTOR 3: SIZE OF TERRITORY 
 One of the most obvious differences between British India and mandatory Palestine is the 
size of the territory. The differences in size determined how much leeway and flexibility each 
commission had to draw the boundaries without threatening the viability of each state. While 
India’s vast size gave the boundary commission flexibility in drawing the boundaries and in 
determining how people would move around, Palestine’s size did the exact opposite. In this 
section, I explain how each region’s size affected the different partition processes and outcomes.   
India’s vast territory allowed the boundary commission greater opportunity to maneuver 
the boundaries. The level of leeway was high, which meant that any discrepancies that the 
commission made would not have threatened the viability of India or Pakistan. There were 
certainly consequences for which Hindus and Muslim suffered, but the fact remains that the 
boundary stayed in place and both India and Pakistan became sovereign states. Although they 
were on a timeline, Radcliffe and his commission were able to determine boundaries even if they 
were not perfect. After all, all sides had already pledged to partition and accept the territory 
regardless of the results. Radcliffe and the commission could afford to be ambiguous, as proved 
to be the case in the description of the boundary report. The report only allots few paragraphs to 
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describe the entire boundary, using the names of villages and other natural landmarks as 
reference.  
Palestine’s small size, however, complicated the partition process. Because there was not 
much land, any errors that the commissions made drawing the boundary proposals would likely 
affect the other side in some way. Palestine’s tiny size did not allow for as much flexibility and 
compromise. As the High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan once expressed, 
Weizmann… realizes that this [Jewish] State cannot include the whole of Palestine and 
therefore he suggests that we should satisfy ourselves with a part of it; that is to say, he 
agrees with Partition, provided we get an adequate share. That is the main part of his 
activities now—to ensure that the future Jewish state is of maximum size.16  
 
 The territory was so small, that it was difficult for the British to create a plan to which both sides 
agreed. Moreover, the Arabs had already rejected the notion of partition, so it was pointless that 
they continued to do so. 
Palestine was so small that there was not a whole lot of room to move people around. As 
an extract from the Report of the Ministerial Committee on Palestine from the Colonial Office 
Records from reads, “If the two towns were placed in different States, the boundary between the 
States would have to be drawn down the centre of a road. The Partition Commission found itself 
forced to envisage such a road with a high iron railing, forming the actual boundary, along the 
middle of it…”17 Furthermore, the way in which the religious populations were dispersed was 
not contiguous, as was the case in India. Palestine’s small size made it difficult for Jews and 
Arabs to live faraway from each other. As a result, there were several intermixed communities 
that were harder to isolate.  
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In addition, the influx of Jews had created such positive economic changes that it was, in 
fact, proving to possible for them to establish their own state. As was recorded in a Palestine 
Policy document from the Colonial Office Records from 1943: “The Arab portions of Palestine, 
both Galilee and the area lying to the east and south of the Jewish State, will be much too weak, 
both economically and politically, to stand alone […] and, as things stand at present, will have to 
be fused, respectively, with the Lebanon and Trans-Jordan.”18 Because of this economic success 
in such a small piece of territory, the British believed that it was more convenient for the Arabs 
to remain where they were or to not be annexed to Greater Syria or Trans-Jordan—which is what 
the British had hoped for before the Peel Commission came into question in 1937. Even in 1947, 
there were doubts as to whether an Arab state would survive with the small bits of land it would 
receive from an already small territory. In addition a majority of Palestine was desert, which 
would be another challenge in regard to cultivating the land. Because of the limited amount of 
territory and the failed efforts of Arabs to be economically independent, the British believed that 
the Palestinian Arabs needed to be part of another Arab entity in order to progress. As was stated 
in concluding minutes in 1947: “There should be no great difficulty in making the Jewish share 
reasonably viable, while the Arab share might become viable if it were linked with Trans-Jordan. 
It had also been argued that Partition would alienate the Arab world.”19 
FACTOR 4: SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORY 
Religious sites and cultural and religious attachment to the land played different roles in 
each case. The strong religious and cultural connection to the territory in Palestine played a 
dominant role in the partition. Arab and Jewish claims to the physical territory was prioritized 	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over the idea of creating two separate states with their respective communities, as was the case in 
India. In this section, I argue that the emphasis on religious sites and cultural and religious 
attachment to the territory interfered in reaching an agreement that both sides could accept. 
In India, religious sites did not determine the way the boundaries would be drawn. The 
priority of Muslims and Hindus was to reach an agreement in which both sides could have an 
independent state and live in their respective religious communities. In the partition minutes and 
correspondences between political leaders, there are no references made to specific mosques or 
temples; instead, the discussions are based on religious contiguity and natural landmarks that 
would minimally alter the ways populations were dispersed. 
 It is important to note, however, that there were some exceptions. For example, Sikhs 
claimed specific strips of territory based on the fact that there were religious monuments in those 
areas. As a Mr. Henderson expressed in a Sikh memorandum: “…whatever division is made, it is 
essential to safeguard the shrines of the Sikhs and in particular the principal Sikh shrine at 
Amritsar, which corresponds for Sikhs to Mecca for Islam.”20 This religious attachment to the 
land played a role in Sikh desires, and helped determine that Amritsar be included in India. 
However, the Sikhs did not play a large role in the way the territory was divided; the British, the 
League, and the Congress generally ignored their other requests and movement for sovereignty. 
Unlike the Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus did not argue for specific religious sites.  
In contrast to the partition of British India, the partition discussions and proposals of 
mandatory Palestine were based on the analysis of the importance of and access to religious sites 
in addition to spiritual and cultural connections to specific territories. Because of the claims to 
religious sites from all sides and inability to distribute them in ways that would satisfy all, British 	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had proposed a neutral Jerusalem state. The purpose of this state was to avoid further conflict by 
allotting the most meaningful religious sites to one religion or the other. As was discussed by the 
Ministerial Committee on Palestine on December 1943, the Jerusalem state would remain in 
control of the British in order to avoid disputes and “…to ensure free access to the Holy Places 
by the adherents of all religions [and] to settle disputes arising out of the rights and claims of the 
different religious communities in respect of the Holy Places.”21 As was further discussed in 
British Colonial Office documents: “The true religious issue centres round Jerusalem, the third 
most holy city of Islam, and the fear of this city passing into Jewish control will be finally 
removed by the creation of the Jerusalem state.”22 This idea remained when the United Nations 
proposed its plan on November 1947. The Jerusalem State would remain neutral and be under 
U.N control. 
In addition to religious attachment to territory, there was a sense of cultural attachment to 
the land—on both the Arab and the Jewish side—which made partition negotiations more 
complicated. For example, Zionism claimed that Jews had a right to their homeland and that 
meant the entire land of Israel. As a memorandum submitted by the Jewish Agency to the H.M. 
Government from 7 September 1945 reads, “…the country [Palestine] in its present state was 
their creation and it was the only place where Jews have a home created by themselves to which 
they had belonged through centuries in their hearts.23”	  Even with the backlash that the movement 
received, Zionists refused to surrender their claims. As Chaim Weizmann stated in1946 at the 
Zionist Congress in Basle,  
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Our claim for a state is sometimes represented as an act of extremism. What is natural for 
Bulgarians, Armenians, Transjordanians, and many other national groups which have no 
greater claim than ourselves on the conscience of the world, is somehow regarded as an 
unreasonable benefaction for the Jews. We refuse to accept this inequality. These things 
which all other nations possess we claim in the name of equality and our sufferings for 
ourselves.24  
 
In agreement with Zionist appeals and pleased to see that Jews were closer to the realization of 
their dream, M. Shertok, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, wrote to the Chief 
Secretary: “It has long been the desire of the Zionist movement to see its Congresses meet in 
Palestine. After the wholesale destruction of Jewish life in Europe, Palestine is the obvious 
venue.”25 As David Ben-Gurion added in November 1945:  
We firmly believe that history has decreed that we should cooperate with Great Britain, 
but the British people must realize that the Jews of Palestine, and the millions outside 
who have set their hearts on Palestine, will never agree that the return of Jews to their 
historic homeland should be dependent on anyone else’s consent; that Jews in Palestine 
should remain a minority; and that they should be deprived of statehood.26 
 
At last, the idea of a Jewish state was no longer abstract and far-fetched but rather tangible and 
quite possible. The problem, however, was that Jews were not the only ones with cultural 
attachments and historic connections to the land. 
This element of cultural attachment to the territory also applied to Arab populations. 
Many had lived in the territory for centuries and had developed connections to the land through 
generations. As was discussed in the British Colonial Office documents discussing the Arab 
areas:  
…Arabs refused to move, even though the land offered was often greatly superior to their 
previous holdings and situated within 30 or 40 miles of them. They preferred to remain in 
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situ, either cultivating the small areas which were left to them or camping on 
neighbouring land and taking casual work as labourers.27  
The persistence of Arabs to stay put shows the depth of their connection the territory. In addition, 
there was a greater pan-Arabism of the general Middle Eastern territory that influenced the 
Palestinian Arabs. As a document on thr proceedings of a meeting of the Arab Premiers in Cairo 
from December 1947 from Foreign Office Records reads, “The general impression gained from 
many conversations was that the Arab States feel there is nothing for it but to resist the decision 
of U.N.O. with force although it is probably that some if not all of them would be glad to find a 
way out, provided it did not involve the setting up of a Jewish Sovereign State.”28   The Arabs in 
Palestine had support from their neighbors, whereas the Jews did not.  
The desire for partition in India came from the fact that Indians and Muslims had come to 
dislike each other and that Muslims felt repressed by the Indian elites. In the Palestine case, it 
was the desire to be in Palestine, the long-lost Jewish homeland, that inspired partition. 
FACTOR 5: FORM OF BRITISH RULE 
 One of the biggest differences between British India and mandatory Palestine was the 
form of British rule. Because each region had a different form of British rule—a colony as 
opposed to a mandate—it is not surprising that the cases had different fates. In this section, I 
contrast the forms of British rule and how the nature of British imperialism affected the end 
result of each case.   
Because of Britain’s long presence in India, Britain did not want to appear weak or 
incapable of following through with their departure of the subcontinent. As George Maconachie 
Brander, the private secretary to the Governor of the Punjab, stated in in a letter: “Successive 	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British governments had promised the Indians self government and there is no doubt that self 
government was eagerly desired by the majority of Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike. The 
British were committed to granting home rule to India. The only matters in this dispute were 
when and how.”29 
The high level of British authority in India that lasted for almost a century heightened 
Britain’s sense of responsibility when it came to decolonization in India. After all, British 
dominance in India—both economically and socially—had made India the Jewel in the Crown of 
the British Empire. For example, many English people lived in and considered British India their 
home and profited from its crops and resources—India became a major export market for British 
goods, including textiles, iron and steel goods, machinery, and other products reflecting Britain’s 
industrial strength. In return, India supplied Britain with critically needed raw materials, 
including cotton, indigo, jute, rice, oil seeds, and tea.30 This strong attachment to and dependence 
on India created a heightened sense of responsibility for the British who were living in India, 
which led the British to be very involved in and committed to the partition process and to strive 
for some viable solution.  
Boundary negotiations occurred between the Muslim League, the Indian National 
Congress, and the British; however, just because there was communication does not mean that 
there was an even distribution of power.  While it seems as if the League and the Congress 
played a large role in the drawing of boundaries, it was truly the British that remained in control 
as the ultimate authority mediating disagreements—given that Cyril Radcliffe acted as the head 	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of the boundary commissions and had the final word on decisions. Radcliffe observed at one 
point that “…the divergence of opinion between my colleagues was so wide that an agreed 
solution of the boundary problem was not to be obtained.”31 Although a telegram dated 5 July 
1947 from the Governor’s Secretary in the Punjab to DPSV in New Delhi read, “…it [was] 
important that the chairman should not only be, but appear to be, free from official influence.”32 
Radcliffe had clear authority to make final decisions. In addition, letters circulated between 
Radcliffe, Mountbatten, and Beaumont—Radcliffe’s secretary—negotiating what cities and 
regions would be awarded, underlining how decisions were made at a high level of authority. As 
Radcliffe stated in the Partition Council Minutes from 12 June – 11 July: “‘…the members of the 
Commissions were akin to assessors and the Chairman would act in the role of Umpire and give 
his awards.’”33 The ability to make key decisions secured Britain’s upper hand in the matter. 
The Peace Conference at San Remo in 1920 determined that Palestine, which according 
to the Sykes-Picot Agreement was supposed to become an area of international administration, 
was now a zone of outright British interest.34 The League of Nations, however, was supposed to 
be theoretically in charge. Nevertheless, the British and the French had come together at this 
Conference to carve up the Levant amongst themselves. Because Palestine was a mandate 
acquired only in 1920, as opposed to a colony, Britain’s sense of responsibility for the people of 
Palestine was not as high as it was in other parts of its empire, especially India. Rather, the 
British used the mandate as a tool to increase their income and get access to resources.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Cited in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 56214. 
32 “File 1446/17/GG/43 - Coll I Boundary Commission,” 1947. IOR/R/3/1/157.; 124 
33 “Partition Council Minutes,” August 1947. Mss Eur IOR Neg 15564/6. Title: India Partition Council Minutes: 12 
June – 11 July 1947; 219-220 
34 Cohen, Michael J. Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. Place of publication not identified: Princeton 
University Press, 2014: 3. 
81 
By the end of World War II, Britain wanted to be free of all responsibility pertaining to 
the territory and did not feel obligated to reach a definite solution because it resigned from being 
a mandatory power. When it was time for the British to leave Palestine, there was no official 
contract or plan by which the different parties would abide. The British only worried about the 
expiration of the mandate, and did not dictate ideas as to what would happen once they left. As 
the British stated in the United Nations in February 1948: 
For the past 25 years we have tried to discharge the obligations of our mandate—that is, 
to respect and preserve the rights of the Arab Community at the same time to fulfill the 
internationally proclaimed object of establishing a National Home for the Jews. We have 
certainly made mistakes, but we can be proud of our vast contribution to the development 
of Palestine and the Middle East. The Mandate, however, was inherently contradictory, 
and neither Jews nor Arabs felt that their interests and aspirations were adequately 
satisfied.35  
 
There came a point in which the British did not want any more responsibility for the Palestine 
question. As a result, Britain argued, “The only alternative to a firm decision by His Majesty’s 
Government, and its resolute enforcement, is an attempt to divest ourselves of all further 
responsibility for Palestine by surrendering the mandate either to the United States or to the 
United Nations.”36 The numerous failed partition efforts, Britain’s worsening economic situation, 
and the inability of different parties to agree with each other led the British to hand over the 
partition of Palestine to the United Nations. The British did not remain the mediator of power 
throughout the boundary-making process nor want to be associated with the issue of partition any 
longer. As was discussed in a set of British Colonial Office records from 1947: 
Further discussion showed that it was the general view of the Cabinet that the right 
course was now to submit the whole problem to the United Nations… This submission 
would not involve an immediate surrender of the Mandate; but His Majesty’s 
Government would not be under an obligation themselves to enforce whatever solution 	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the United Nations might approve. If the settlement suggested by the United Nations 
were not acceptable to us, we should be at liberty then to surrender the Mandate and 
leave the United Nations to make other arrangements for the future administration of 
Palestine.37  
 
When the mandate expired—which is when the British said they would leave—there was 
a vacuum of power; there was no overarching authority that could legitimize the next step for 
Palestine’s inhabitants. The British left Palestine and “…took no responsibility for restoring 
order in Palestine where conditions deteriorated into anarchy with Jews and Arabs fighting out 
their differences.”38 Even though there continued to be clashes and protests between Jews and 
Arabs, the Jews went forward with the UN partition plan of 1947 and accepted those boundaries 
as the borders to their new Jewish state. Fundamentally, the problem was that the Arabs had not 
agreed to adopt the UN boundaries, but because of the lack of an overarching authority, there 
was nothing that the Arabs could do except for going to war against the Jews the very next day. 
Thus, Britain abandoned the situation, creating more problems, rather than serving as a powerful 
mediator of power between both parties. 
The difference of British power in each case created different results. Both cases remain 
examples of British imperialism, but the relationship of the British to each territory and their 
differing histories in each place played a role in the ways in which they handled each situation. 
In the India case, the British cared about their reputation, and they had also been there much 
longer. As Lucy Chester adds, “...in British India, which was so large that many British officials 
considered it an empire in its own right, Britain was accountable to no one.”39 However, the 
British had obtained the Palestine mandate as a prize for winning the First World War and had 	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not been in the territory for as long as it had been in India. Britain’s type of rule shaped its 
priorities, which in turn created different effects in each region. 
FACTOR 6: IMMIGRATION – STATIC V. FLUCTUATING 
 Immigration influenced the partitions internally and externally. In other words, people 
moving (or not moving) into territories played just as important of a role as people moving (or 
not moving) within the territories themselves. In this section, I explain the importance of 
migration on an international and domestic level. Furthermore, I argue that the lack of internal 
migration and external migration in India helped its success, while the strong presence of internal 
and external migration contributed to Palestine’s failure. 
In the India case, fluctuating population dynamics did not factor into the way the 
boundaries were drawn; most of India’s inhabitants had coexisted and lived on that land for 
generations. Even in his 1936 Unity of India speech, Nehru stated that “In India… no one, 
whatever his political views or religious persuasions, thinks in terms other than those of national 
unity.”40 Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were all part of Mother India despite religious differences; 
most had lived peacefully and side by side in India for generations. For centuries, differences in 
religious identity did not overshadow nationalist sentiment and attachment to Mother India. As a 
result of this long-lasting coexistence, even Viceroy Mountbatten expressed the views that 
partition was a measure of last resort: “…I am opposed to the partition of Provinces as I am to 
the partition of India herself and for the same basic reasons.”41 As a result, dividing the land 
according to who was already there allowed for an easier division of territory.   
India’s inhabitants saw India as their home regardless of their religious identities. It was 
religion that caused tensions and separation among the religious communities, but there was 	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never an influx of incoming newcomers to further exacerbate the tensions. The lack of 
immigration to India provided the boundary commissioners some form of stability with which to 
work; they did not have to take into consideration changing population demographics, which is 
why they were able to base their boundaries on religious contiguity. Rather, the existing 
population had lived in India for many years, developing a sentimental attachment to their 
territory that became apparent after the partition occurred. Many people who had to cross the 
Indo-Pakistani border suffered physically and emotionally; they were forced to leave what had 
been their homes for generations.  
Throughout the 19th century, modern anti-Semitism was on the rise as nationalist 
sentiment spread across Europe. Despite the fact that there were Jews who felt very patriotic and 
nationalistic about their countries, the fact remained that Jews’ efforts to integrate themselves 
into their respective countries were never completely successful. Citizens perceived Jews as 
aliens, regardless of how patriotic and committed they were to their respective nationalist causes. 
It did not matter if they were in the army or in government; their Jewish identity prevented them 
from fully integrating in society and from gaining equitable status compared to other inhabitants. 
This discrimination was due to the rise of modern anti-Semitism—discrimination against Jews 
based on their racial and ethnic identity more so than their religious practices. The combination 
of nationalism and modern anti-Semitism resulted in dire consequences, with the worst one of all 
being the Holocaust.  
Jewish immigrants into Palestine settled in cities, which led to an expansion of urban 
centres, thriving Jewish life, and an overall change in population demographics. Tel Aviv and its 
suburbs absorbed no less than half the new immigrants, the number of Jews in Jerusalem shot up, 
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and Haifa’s Jewish population nearly tripled between 1931 and 1935.42 This increase in Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, however, changed the demographics on the ground. Because the 
demographics were changing, it was becoming more and more difficult to identify what the 
Jewish and Arab states might become in the event of partition. Partition aimed to reflect religious 
demographics, but these demographics were consistently changing as new proposals were 
created. As was discussed in a report printed for the War Cabinet on October 1944: “…the most 
must be made of the potentialities of Palestine for immediate large-scale immigration. Palestine 
is already a twice-partitioned country, as compared with what it was at the time of the Balfour 
Declaration.”43 Furthermore, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended in 1946 that 
100,000 Jewish survivors be admitted to Palestine. Even with restrictions of immigration, illegal 
immigration continued to occur, changing the demographics all the time. Jews were still 
establishing settlements all across the mandate of Palestine.44 
Furthermore, Arabs feared the political consequences of Jewish immigration—the Arab 
leaders were alarmed by the influx of Jewish newcomers, and feared that they would engulf all 
of Palestine, 45  which resulted in an intensification of an already existing Arab political 
awakening. As a communiqué issued by the Heads of the Arab States in Cairo from 17 
December, 1947 read, “When the sins of Imperialism and the greed of the Zionists met over the 
setting up of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, the Arabs of that country were plunged 
into calamity, since they had forcefully imposed on them groups of foreigners coming from the 
East and West with their own languages, customs, and social systems.”46 The Arabs perceived 
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the immigration of Jews as Western imperialists and completely imposing, which did not 
confrontation efforts between both peoples. This political awakening, in turn, resulted in a 
heightened sense of Palestinian nationalism that would lead to more heated tensions and a lower 
chance of accepting any partition proposals put forth.  
Immigration played a central role in determining the future of British India and the 
Palestine Mandate. The ongoing, changing demographics of Palestine’s population changed what 
the region looked like, making it more difficult to draw boundaries in viable ways. The 
fluctuating immigration levels contributed to a very different situation in 1947 than in 1937. 
While partition remained an option, the demographics changed so much from year to year that it 
became difficult to create a plan that would create religiously contiguous areas with no faults; 
however, that proved to be impossible. Contrastingly, the populations in India remained in place 
for most of the time. While there may have been movements from time to time, people remained 
in the same general areas, which made it easier for Radcliffe to draw borders according to 
religious contiguity and natural landmarks to which people were accustomed. While the 
boundaries were not perfect, the stable populations inside of India, and the lack of external 
immigration to India, allowed for Radcliffe to create a cartographically stable boundary. 
FACTOR 7: WHOSE INTERESTS? 
While there may have been international interests in India, the partition of British India 
remained a matter of the Congress, the League, and the British. The exchanges between were all 
part of one giant conversation, in which each party expressed its goals and desires. The 
discussions remained a domestic matter pertaining to its native inhabitants and the British. 
Mandatory Palestine, on the other hand, remained a matter of international concern. The 
international participation, which the British tended to prioritize over the needs of the Jews and 
87 
the Arabs because of the mandate’s theoretical international ownership, resulted in a prolonged, 
excruciatingly complicated partition process that failed in producing two viable states. In this 
section, I discuss how foreign interference and the prioritization of their needs further 
complicated the partition of Palestine, while contrastingly, the seemingly apparent prioritization 
of India’s inhabitants allowed for the viability of the Radcliffe line.  
 The negotiations in British India occurred as part of a giant conversation between the 
British, the League and the Congress—even if the British actually had most of the decision-
making power. Nevertheless, leaders from both the Congress and the League were able to 
express their thoughts and opinions. The focus of the partition efforts remained on creating an 
India and a Pakistan, even though there may have been international interests in the region.  
In addition, Britain wanted to preserve its image of power, which is why is a possible 
reason as to why Britain wanted to partition India on its own. As Lucy Chester explains,  
With their global empire in the balance, the British were determined to demonstrate that 
they could handle the decolonization of India without any foreign assistance. Reliance on 
the UN […] could damage Britain’s image in the rest of its colonial holdings, 
domestically and in the eyes of its allies, particularly in the Middle East.47  
 
The British had been so powerful that they wanted to maintain their image of superiority and 
maintain and uphold their powerful reputation. As a result, the British needed to evacuate India 
as efficiently as they could in order to “…avoid projecting the image that they were handing over 
power under duress. British leaders worked hard to create the impression that the handover was 
proceeding in an orderly and rational manner.”48  
There was no interference from outside players—such as the United Nations or other 
states—which allowed for conversations to remain regional and to focus on the sovereignty of its 
inhabitants and to prioritize the desires of the people living in that territory. Many different 	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nations were not trying to advance their own interests through the partition of the subcontinent, 
which is why they did not interfere. The exclusiveness of the Boundary Commissions, therefore, 
allowed for the quick creation of the boundary. As a result, the British mediated all matters, 
ascertaining that the Indian Congress and the Muslim League listened to and negotiated with 
each other.  
Palestine, however, was quite different; as David Ben-Gurion stated in a Press 
Conderence in London on 14 November, 1945: “[t]he Palestine problem is not a local one. It is 
not a question between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. It is a world problem. It is a problem 
between the Jewish people and whole civilized world.”49 Indeed, several international players 
such as France, the Soviet Union, and the United States were part of its partition—foreign 
interests were at play, even if the British managed to give the impression that the independence 
of the Arabs and the Jews was their priority. For example, the United States became an 
overarching and influential player, as is recorded in the British Colonial Office: “[t]he 
Government of the United States will, of course, have to be consulted before effect can be given 
to the scheme, and we fully realize the immense advantages which will accrue if American 
support can be enlisted in its favour.”50  
Like the British, the United States had interests with both the Jews and the Arabs. In 
1942-1943, Roosevelt expressed an interest in the Zionist cause, but the president’s assurances of 
friendship were “cautiously deprecated by American ambassadors in Arab nations, even as 
Roosevelt himself privately minimized their importance to Zionist leaders.”51 By the time Harry 
Truman became president, it was clear that the United States had flip-flopped between the Jews 	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and Arabs according to where its best interests were. For example, Truman’s support of Jewish 
immigration into Palestine was determined by domestic politics and by his “long history of 
sympathy for the underdog, in politics, economics, and religion…”52 
The United States had more interests in the Middle East after World War II, which 
resulted in more interference in the partition efforts. As Sachar explains, “Ultimately, to Arabs 
and Jews alike, everything hinged on the attitude of the United States, by common recognition 
the most powerful force in the world body.”53 The political agenda of the international players 
detracted from the main and most important aspect of partition: to give both the Jews and the 
Arabs a place to call home. Indeed, international players prioritized their own interests, resulting 
in a more complicated process. The great powers, especially, did not seem to care. As the high 
commissioner for Trans-Jordan once expressed, 
We can see that all promises given to the Arabs regarding their independence need not be 
treated seriously. It is obvious that no state, France not Great Britain, intends to surrender 
its interests in the Middle East, which are organically connected with their Mandates in 
this part of the world. If the French stand strongly upon their intentions—and I hope they 
do—they will offer an example to the British of how not to fear the Arabs. The promises 
given to the Arabs in the White Paper, on which they rely so much, need not be treated so 
seriously either.54  
 
Rather than truly focusing on the needs of the Jews and the Arabs, the British prioritized their 
imperial interests and thus negotiated with whomever would give them the most advantage. 
Essentially, the British did not truly care neither of the populations living in Palestine. For 
example, as a memorandum from the Anglo-Jewish Association stated, “In the War the Jewish 
National Home has made a worthy contribution to the Allied cause in manpower and production. 
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In the coming peace it can, if given full facilities for immigration and the use of natural 
resources, make a major contribution to the welfare of the Middle East.”55  
In addition to the United States, the USSR supported partition because of their interests in 
the Middle East. According to a confidential telegram from 2 January 1948, the “Soviet Union 
had supported partition because they expected to profit from Jewish-Arab disturbances.”56 This 
Soviet support was not received well by Arabs, who continued to oppose any form of partition. 
Instead, the Arabs wanted their own state in which there would be an Arab majority and 
sovereignty, barring the Jews from obtaining positions of power and outnumbering them. The 
United Nations, however, ignored those Arab claims and proposed a partition plan, in their eyes 
another proposal for compromise between both sides. 
The ways in which the land was partitioned were based on benefitting the great powers. 
Foreign interests influenced the partition efforts, which in turn exacerbated the chaos and high 
level of disagreement. Nevertheless, the foreign powers continued to prioritize themselves. For 
example, the British claimed that  
…the port of Haifa is of such strategic importance that there might be advantage from the 
point of view of the Protecting Powers in an arrangement under which the city and the 
land immediately surrounding it would be formed into an Enclave and administered by 
the authority responsible for the administration of the Jerusalem territory. The fact that 
the population of the city is mixed, consisting of 88,398 Jews and 64,220 Arabs, would 
afford further justification for such an arrangement. On the other hand, it would have 
serious repercussions on the economy of the Jewish state.57 
 
 Clearly, this division focused on the benefits that Britain could get rather than practicability. In 
this statement, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs even points out that the Jewish state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 CO733/461/40: Palestine Annex: Palestine Policy – Memorandum from Anglo-Jewish Association, 1945; Policy 
in Palestine: Memorandum Submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: 6. 
56 “Partition of Palestine,” 1948. UK FO 816/115.; En Chair – by confidential bag; telegram of particular secrecy; 
No. 2 Intel; 2nd January, 1948; 82/1 
57 CO 733/461/22 – Palestine Policy: The Arab Areas]; Thin tracing paper titled: Extract from Report of Ministerial 
Committee on Palestine; Inclusion of Haifa in the Jewish State; Dec. 20th 1943; 11 
91 
would be at a disadvantage if this were to be implemented; nevertheless, the fact remained that 
the great powers would benefit. As was admitted by the British themselves: “The fate of 
Palestine is so undeniably a matter of international concern that we shall in any case be required 
to account for our policy there.”58  
 Evidently, there were many more outside players involved in the partition of the mandate. 
As a result of their requests, clashes, and manipulation, the partition process slowed down and 
became more complex. Rather than prioritizing the Jews and Arabs who were living in Palestine, 
the British and the imperial powers prioritized their own needs. After all, “prestige has been 
defined as the ‘shadow cast by power.’”59 In contrast, the British prioritized their preservation of 
their perceived power in India, but they remained the ones in control the entire time. Their 
presence and dedication—even if it was for their own good as opposed to the people of India—
allowed for better planning and agreement. Furthermore, the absence of international players 
allowed for the Congress and the League to prioritize their needs, even if their requests were not 
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CONCLUSION 
The ambitious nature of this project was not evident to me until I was in the midst of 
doing the research. The comparative aspect of this project, in addition to choosing two of the 
most contested would regions, made it challenging to arrive at conclusions. In fact, I could have 
focused on just one region—as opposed to two—and still produced the same volume of 
information. In addition to the incredibly complex histories of both regions, the limited amount 
of time available made it more difficult to dig into each case in detail. Nevertheless, the 
comparative aspect of this project revealed interesting insights and results. 
First, some of the factors that I found and analyzed cannot be examined in isolation. In 
other words, some factors overlapped and affected each other throughout the partition processes 
and, in some cases, even led to the creation of another. For example, the presence of an initial 
mutual agreement in India—which proved to be one of the most important factors—established 
common goals and set deadlines to create two individual states. This establishment of tight 
deadlines, in turn, contributed to the necessity for speed. The necessity for speed, in turn, 
prevented outside players from intervening in the commissions, as there was no time to waste in 
debate. Contrastingly, the lack of an agreement in mandatory Palestine caused the opposite 
effect; because neither Jews nor Arabs reached an agreement that could serve as a base, there 
was no foundation for what should have come next. In other words, the commissions that 
developed for the partition of Palestine were pointless right from their point of inception because 
the Arabs had never accepted the principle itself. As a result, the commissions and processes that 
followed the Peel Report in 1937 were automatically futile.  In addition, the ten years from the 
moment the Peel Report was introduced in 1937 to the moment the UN plan was proposed in 
1947 left a lot of time for the population demographics to change and for outside players to 
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intervene. As a result, the desires and circumstances of 1947 differed from those of 1937. And 
yet, commissions kept making proposals without truly noticing what was happening on the 
ground and understanding what the populations at stake truly wanted.  
Second, the research revealed that these two cases are fundamentally different. While 
they do have some similarities, the fact remains that invariable factors, like size and significance 
of territory, played a key role in each case. For example, the small size of Palestine left little 
room to maneuver the territory and made it difficult for populations to disperse all over the 
territory in ways that completely separated each people from one another. Contrastingly, the vast 
size of India allowed for the commissions to have more flexibility and freedom in drawing the 
lines. Furthermore, the type of sources that I analyzed at the British Library and the National 
Archives in England were different. The sources pertaining to British India focus more on the 
nature of the commissions and the principles on which the boundaries were drawn, as opposed to 
the sources for mandatory Palestine, which reveal tensions from all sides in trying to reach an 
agreement. Once again, the principle of establishing a mutual agreement is present even in the 
type of documents examined.  
Thirdly, most of the documentation to which I had access was from the British, as they 
were the ruling authority in both regions. As a result, I did not get to examine personal narratives 
from the people being affected by all of these partition efforts. Had there been more dialogue 
between the people being affected and less interference by the British and the imperial powers, 
perhaps there would have been a more viable solution.  
If given more time, I would have delved deeper into the complex histories of each world 
region. Now that I have identified variables, it would be interesting to return to the archives and 
explore the effect that those factors had on the partition efforts in more detail. Furthermore, I 
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would keep the comparative nature of this project because it proved to be extremely useful in 
identifying what worked and did not work despite the different availability of materials for each 
case. The juxtaposition of both cases was useful because it accentuated the successes and failures 
of each case, and the factors that allowed for my claims. My hope is that these findings serve as a 
base for further comparative research in regard to partition and geopolitics across the globe. By 
examining different geopolitical processes and comparing them to each other, I hope to reveal 
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